Showing posts with label nuclear power issue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear power issue. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

European Expert: U.S. Policymakers Are 'As Wrong As They Can Be' About The French...

Comment: Virginia future governors, GA, wake and smell the nuke coffee! Never, I mean never say "We Want to be like France"! France has problems with their Nukes! NO to Nukes! No to uranium mining!

Tue Sep 15, 2009 11:00am EDT

Marignac Says "Far From Being a Model, France Should be a Powerful Cautionary
Tale for the U.S. about the Folly of a Headlong Rush into More Nuclear Power"

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- U.S. policy makers are in the grips of "dangerous and costly illusions" if they think that France is a model showing how nuclear power could be implemented aggressively in the United States, according to Yves Marignac, a leading international consultant on nuclear energy issues and the executive director of the energy information agency WISE-Paris.

In visits this week with state and federal officials, Marignac is debunking the myth of the so-called "French nuclear model" that is being touted as a blueprint for the revival of the embattled nuclear power industry in the U.S.

His visit comes at a particular key time, as the U.S. Senate considers additional subsidies to the nuclear industry in its version of pending climate legislation and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) seeks public comment on weakening the rules for loan-guarantee bailouts of proposed new reactors.

Yves Marignac said: "I am at a loss to understand how the United States could be so far off the mark in its understanding of the French experience with nuclear power.

The so-called 'success story' of the French nuclear program, which is being promoted so assiduously by the U.S. nuclear industry, is a complete disconnect with the stark reality of the 50-year history of rising costs, steadily worsening delays, technological dead-ends,failed industrialchallenges and planning mistakes.

If American policymakers are going to weigh the example of France, they need to get the facts instead of settling for the fantasy being sold to them by the US nuclear industry."

In his remarks today, Marignac noted the following key problems:

-- French nuclear technology is deeply flawed.
The French EPR Reactor is a new reactor design developed by the company Areva in cooperation with the German firm Siemens. British and Finnish nuclear regulators have also raised significant safety questions, in particular about the computerized command and control
system proposed for these reactors.

-- French nuclear reactor construction delays are getting steadily worse,
not better. Alongside increasing costs, construction times have
proven to be problematic. The last four reactors that were built in France,
two units in Chooz and two in Civaux, were only connected on average 10.5
years after construction work began, and subsequent safety problems
caused further delays. Their official industrial service only started
in 2000 and 2002 respectively, some 15.5 and 12.5 years after construction
started.

-- French nuclear reactor costs are just as out of control as they are in
the U.S. The EPR has been promoted as a technology that makes nuclear energy cheaper and more competitive. When the decision was made to build an EPR in Finland in 2002, the government promised that it would cost Euro 2.5 billion and take only four years to build. The final contract, three years later, put the price at Euro 3 billion and construction time was set at 4.5 years. Since construction began in summer 2005, a variety of technical problems have led to a three and a half-year delay, extending the construction period to at least 7 years.

-- Nuclear power in France has not promoted energy independence. Nuclear
power in France is a major presence, providing 76 percent of electricity produced in 2008. However, electricity accounted for only 20.7 percent of the final energy consumption in France that year. Nuclear power cannot provide energy security, as it only has a marginal effect upon oil consumption, which is dominated by the transport sector. France consumes more oil per capita than the European average, and despite its long-term objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by three-quarters, it seems incapable of bucking an upward trend. This is due largely to the weak policies on energy efficiency and new energy sources, influenced by the lock-in of nuclear power.

-- French nuclear power is not "safer" . . . and the nation does not have a long term solution to waste storage. The operators of the 200 nuclear facilities in France declare a very large number of events - considered relevant for safety - every year. EDF alone declares between 10,000 and 12,000, of which 700 to 800 are deemed "incidents" or "significant events. This total does not account for some 12,000 m3 of waste from the reprocessing plant in Marcoule that was dumped into the sea in 1967 and 1969. While reprocessing is presented as a means to reduce the volume of highly-radioactive long-lived wastes in final disposal, it actually increases the complexity of waste management, and thereby the danger for the population and environment. Reprocessing comes with numerous extra nuclear facilities and transports, each creating extra safety risks.
But also 'normal' radiation exposure arising from routine operations increases, for example by the radioactive discharges of La Hague reprocessing plants, with authorized discharge levels up to 1000 times higher than those applying to the nearby Flamanville nuclear power station. And even France, supposedly the country of nuclear expertise, has no long-term solution for its nuclear wastes.

-- Nuclear power in France is not popular.
The pursuit of the nuclear program in France is a permanently undemocratic choice. Contrary to the image presented in the United States, the French population is no more in favor of nuclear power than the European average - indeed a majority is opposed to the building of new plants. Surveys repeatedly show that the public lacks confidence in the institutional promoters of nuclear power.
-- The "nationalized" nuclear model in France is completely incompatible with the market-driven U.S.
In 2001, Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires (Cogema - General Company for Nuclear Materials), a private company established in 1976, merged with Framatome, the nuclear reactor builder, to create the Areva group. Currently, 96 percent of the share capital of the Areva group is held by the French state and large French industries.
-- State ownership of French nuclear power means that the true costs are hidden.
Though largely in an indirect fashion, French taxpayers bear a large part of the nuclear costs. ABOUT YVES MARIGNAC

Yves Marignac is executive director of the energy information agency WISE-Paris, which he joined in 1997, after four years shared between academic research at Paris-XI University and applied studies in the French nuclear institute CEA and the nuclear company STMI. (go to link to read all his great works against Nukes)SOURCE Yves Marignac, WISE-Paris, and Nuclear Information and Resource Service Ailis Aaron Wolf, +1-703-276-3265 or aawolf@hastingsgroup.com, for Yves Marignac

Leading European Industry Expert to Debunk Myth of 'French Nuclear Model' For U.S.

Mon Sep 14, 2009 11:00am EDT

50 Years of French Failings in Nuclear Power Seen As Poor Model for U.S.; Nation's Nuclear Woes Seen Escalating in Huge Cost Overruns at Finnish, Flamanville Reactor Projects

Yves Marignac, a leading international consultant on nuclear energy issues and the executive director of the energy information agency WISE-Paris, will hold a major U.S. news media briefing at 11 a.m. EDT on September 15, 2009 to challenge the myth of the so-called "French nuclear model" that supposedly could serve as a blueprint for the revival of the embattled industry in the U.S.

As the U.S. Senate considers additional subsidies to the nuclear industry in its version of pending climate legislation and the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) seeks public comment on weakening the rules for loan-guarantee bail-outs of proposed new reactors, Marignac is visiting the United States to meet with federal and state officials, among other groups.

He will outline how the "nuclear success story" myth that is being promoted by the U.S. nuclear industry is far removed from the reality of France's 50-year history of technological dead-ends, failed industrial challenges and planning mistakes. Marignac will highlight how these problems have accelerated in recent years with the design flaws, construction problems and ever-escalating cost overruns now plaguing the troubled reactor projects at Olkiluoto 3 in
Finland and Flamanville-3 in France.

Yves Marignac is executive director of the energy information agency WISE-Paris, which he joined in 1997, after four years shared between academic research at Paris-XI University and applied studies in the French nuclear institute CEA and the nuclear company STMI.

His consultant work covers a wide range of nuclear issues for various institutional bodies and NGOs at the national and international level. In 1999-2000, Marignac participated in the economic evaluation of the nuclear option commissioned by French Prime Minister (known as Charpin-Dessus-Pellat report), and in 2001 he was a co-author of a report to the European Parliament's Scientific and Technological Option Assessment (STOA) Panel on reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. In 2005, he acted as consultant to the Commission that organized the
institutional public debate on the project of the new French reactor, EPR (Flamanville-3).

Marignac is the author or co-author of a number of books and other publications, including Nuclear Power, the Great Illusion - Promises, Setbacks and Threats (October 2008) and Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France (April 2008).

TO PARTICIPATE: You can join this live, phone-based news conference (with full, two-way Q&A) at 11 a.m. EDT on September 15, 2009 by dialing 1 (800) 860-2442. Ask for the "debunking the French 'nuclear model'" news event.

CAN'T PARTICIPATE?: A streaming audio replay of the news event will be available on the Web at http://www.nuclearbailout.org as of 5 p.m. EDT on September 15, 2009.
CONTACT: Ailis Aaron Wolf, +1-703-276-3265, aawolf@hastingsgroup.com, for Yves
Marignac, of WISE-Paris /PRNewswire-USNewswire -- Sept. 14/ SOURCE Yves Marignac, of WISE-Paris

http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS148422+15-Sep-2009+PRN20090915

Monday, August 31, 2009

French nuclear workers see risks as conditions worsen

Comment: Attention people in Virginia do not make the statement, "We need to be more like France about Nuclear Power"! Well, duh, I hope not because French Nuke Bunch are not honest or a nice bunch! Just review the following articles on this web site and never say that Virginia wants to be like France!

Sun Aug 30, 2009 9:38pm EDT
By Muriel Boselli

PIERRELATTE, France (Reuters) - Worsening working conditions, inadequate pay rises, pressure to work faster and safety concerns -- these are the familiar grievances of a disaffected work force.

When such complaints arise in France's most sensitive industry -- nuclear power -- alarm bells start ringing.

Cyril Bouche and his colleagues at the Tricastin nuclear plant in the rolling hills of the Drome region say the state-owned utility EDF, which runs France's 58 nuclear reactors and has been expanding into the United States and Britain, is not only cutting costs, but also cutting corners.

The 39-year old, who works for one of EDF's many subcontracting firms, says working conditions at the plant -- hit by a series of incidents that shook public trust in 2008 -- have deteriorated over the past five to 10 years.

"Today France is selling reactors abroad but it should first put its own house in order," said Bouche, the only one of 10 workers interviewed by Reuters who was prepared to be identified.

The French government has put forward state ownership of its nuclear sector as a guarantee of its safety, but former monopoly EDF subcontracts 80 percent of the maintenance at its nuclear reactors to firms such as Vinci, Areva, GDF Suez or Bouygues.

EDF denies the suggestion that subcontracting implies it is skimping, pointing to plans to more than double investments to 8 billion euros in 2009 from 2005 levels to build and modernise nuclear, fuel-fired power plants and hydraulic plants.

"We subcontract because we have very specialized activities. When we change the reactor's fuel, this is a very sophisticated activity," said Philippe Gaestel, head of industrial strategy at EDF.

"We prefer to use subcontractors rather than do it ourselves. This means we have specialists and competencies that we couldn't have internally."

But independent experts including Yves Marignac, executive director of the information agency Wise-Paris, say safety margins in French nuclear power plants are shrinking as plants age, economic pressure mounts and trained staff retire.

"Even if it remains very unlikely, the probability of a serious nuclear incident is rising because of the way things are evolving, and this in itself is very worrying," he told Reuters by telephone.

France's nuclear safety record worsened in 2008.

Last year there was an increase of nearly one-third in nuclear incidents reported by the French nuclear safety watchdog at level one of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), which runs from 0 to 7.

The French nuclear safety board ASN said there had been 72 incidents at level one in 2008, up from 56 in 2007.

NOUGAT

Nuclear is the main industrial sector of the Drome region famous for the nougat delicacy made in the city of Montelimar.

"All in all nuclear must make up between 75 and 80 percent of the region's employment," said Guy Durand, deputy mayor to the town of Pierrelatte, one the three cities which share the nuclear site of Tricastin.

"It's enormous...today there are around 5,000 permanent jobs on the industrial site," Durand added.

For Bouche and others, good pay was the lure to an industry that requires working long hours in dark and confined spaces with the constant risk of exposure to radiation.

A former car mechanic on the minimum wage, Bouche said he doubled his salary when he entered the nuclear sector 18 years ago but that pay had not increased with inflation.

France generates 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear power and is keen to export its expertise, which stretches back three decades, as other countries turn to nuclear to cut carbon emissions and boost their energy independence.

It opted for nuclear after the 1973 oil crisis pushed oil to then-record levels, although the choice was political: the costs of nuclear and fossil fuels are not easy to compare.

Thanks to state intervention in pricing, French consumers pay one of the cheapest rates for electricity in Europe. The French public continued to back the expansion of the industry after the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in Ukraine in 1986, as other countries turned their back on the technology.

But as media attention mounts on atomic energy and France plans to extend its reactors' lifespans and build new ones, public acceptance is diminishing.

A 20-country survey earlier this year by Accenture showed that while public resistance to nuclear power had eased in many countries in the last three years, French consumers had become more negative.

CHOICE TO SUBCONTRACT

The Tricastin workers say they are worried about mounting numbers of small incidents, and point to a lack of oversight.

"In the past we used to work hand-in-hand with EDF on maintenance operations, but little by little EDF has withdrawn to let subcontractors take over," said one of Bouche's colleagues, speaking on condition of anonymity because he feared he may lose his job.

"Now EDF has lost its knowledge," he said, adding that EDF agents now merely played a monitoring role.

Annie Thebaud-Mony, head of research at the French health institute Inserm, said jobs in nuclear power plants were becoming less secure due to privatization and competition.

EDF partially floated its stock in 2005. Core profit for 2008 fell by more than 6 percent to 14.24 billion euros, and the company pledged in February to focus on organic growth after acquisitions in Britain and in the United States inflated its debt to nearly 25 billion euros.

But the company denies it has gradually pulled out from maintenance, saying it chose to subcontract from the outset.

"This was the optimal option to have quality work with specialists who operate permanently on our sites," said EDF's Gaestel. He said the company spent some 1.5 billion euros annually on maintenance, a relatively stable sum for some years.

Bouche and his colleagues say maintenance periods have considerably shortened. Each planned outage costs EDF around 1 million euros per day, the company has confirmed.

"Before, it took two months to do standard refuelling maintenance against three to four weeks now," said a logistics manager who heads a team of 30 and has been in the sector for 22 years.

EDF, which sells electricity to its neighbors, is under pressure to increase the availability of its aging reactors.

EDF's Gaestel said it was important for the operator to stick to its maintenance program drawn up in advance.

"What can be a problem though is when the planning drifts because of technical problems, like at the Tricastin nuclear site in 2008," he said.

France's nuclear watchdog ASN said in its 2008 report that maintenance operations were not always satisfactory because of inappropriate documentation, insufficient protective equipment and too tight a schedule.

It said subcontractor training should be improved.

For the workers, the tight maintenance schedules are adding to the risk of accident.

"We work on top of each other in the nuclear reactor which is very narrow and where it's hard to operate," said a 53-year-old worker. "We can be hit on the head by a hammer or be contaminated. Before, those risks did not exist because we used to take it in turns to work," he said.

While EDF agents have public sector contracts, which means a job for life, subcontractors fall in the private sector, making them vulnerable to job cuts. Their firms risk losing their contracts with EDF every three years.

EDF said not just any company could work in the nuclear sector.

"You have to produce your credentials to work in the nuclear field," Gaestel said. "Before a company can apply to our tenders there is a six-month long audit," he said, adding EDF planned to extend current contracts with subcontractors to six years.

(Editing by Andrew Dobbie and Sara Ledwith)

http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GreenBusiness/idUSTRE57U07K20090831?sp=true

Sunday, August 30, 2009

Safety procedures in disarray at Finland’s Olkiluoto 3 nuclear construction site

COMMENT: Please review the two articles about the problems of the so call "New Nuke Plant Design" and the problems with the French Nuke Bunch! Demand Virginia to stop doing business the French Nuke Connection before they ruin our state with high price nuke plants and their further goals of uranium mining!

Posted by Justin on August 13, 2008 9:00 AM

Documents seen by Greenpeace show that French company Areva is failing to implement vital safety procedures in the troubled construction of its prototype European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) in Olkiluoto, Finland. As well as being 2-3 years behind schedule, 70 per cent over budget, and experiencing 1,500 construction defects along with a damaging fire, the reactor’s safety cannot be guaranteed.

The documents show that, during the construction of the steel framework in the base of the the world's largest nuclear reactor, welders had no specifications as to how the welding should be properly performed for an entire year and, furthermore, tests to ensure the quality of the welding have not been carried out.

Bouygues, an Areva sub-contractor, has had no qualified welding supervisors at the site for over a year and still does not have any. Staff are given a mere two weeks’ training instead of having the international standard university degree. The company also listed people who had not worked in the role as welding supervisors.

Areva, the Finnish nuclear safety authority STUK, and the country’s electricity generator TVO have all been aware of these problems and yet the necessary vital safeguards have not been implemented. Poor welding could cause or exacerbate a nuclear accident – both the reactor cooling system and the reactor itself are mounted on the steel framework. If this is how the construction has proceeded so far, what can we expect when it comes to the installation of reactor components or electronic safety systems?

Nuclear safety expert Dr Helmut Hirsch states that there is a ‘bad safety culture’ at the Olkiluoto 3 site, calling into question the durability of the steel structure and its ability to withstand electrochemical corrosion.

Parts of Olkiluoto 3 affected by the violations

To make matters worse, this is history repeating itself. Lessons have not been learned. Inspections on the construction of the other EPR at Flamanville in France found that a quarter of the welding in the reactor’s steel lining was substandard. Cracks were also found in the reactor’s concrete base. When the problem was discovered, it was sub-contractor Bouygues again at the root of the shortcomings and construction was halted by French nuclear watchdog ASN.

How has all this happened? It looks as if these potentially catastrophic shortcomings in Finland have arisen from the parties seeking to cut corners on rocketing construction costs. Quality standards agreed in contracts between Areva and TVO are poor. Contractual requirements for the competence of welding staff look to have been breached. STUK and TVO have failed to deal with safety violations. TVO has also failed to use sanctions such as stopping construction so that failures could be addressed. It all adds up to a recipe for disaster.

It is clear that there can be little public confidence in the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear reactor. How and why are we to believe assurances on matters of safety from the likes of Areva now and in the future? This is yet another blow to the public relations distortion that nuclear energy is safe. The industry has shown itself - again - to be anything but open and honest in its dealings with the public.

None of us would dream of flying in a plane, driving a car, or living in a house which we knew to be built to such shockingly poor standards of construction, supervision and safety. So why should we tolerate or allow such attitudes, incompetence and deception in the construction of a nuclear facility which, in the event of an accident, could cause massive, unquantifiable damage to our health and the environment? The answer is simple: we can not and we should not.

Areva and its sub-contractors should be reminded whose interests they truly serve. Public safety should always be put before profit and poor procedures. Those responsible for this misconduct should be held to account. The construction of Olkiluoto 3 must be halted.

http://weblog.greenpeace.org/nuclear-reaction/2008/08/breaking_news_safety_procedure.html

In Finland, Nuclear Renaissance Runs Into Trouble

Published: May 28, 2009

OLKILUOTO, Finland — As the Obama administration tries to steer America toward cleaner sources of energy, it would do well to consider the cautionary tale of this new-generation nuclear reactor site.

Henna Aaltonen for The International Herald Tribune

After four years of construction and thousands of recorded defects and deficiencies, the price tag on the reactor in Olkiluoto, Finland, has climbed at least 50 percent.

Henna Aaltonen for The International Herald Tribune

Jouni Silvennoinen, the project manager of the ambitious Olkiluoto nuclear plant. The reactor’s design was supposed to make it cheaper and faster to build, and safer, than older plants.


A blog about energy, the environment and the bottom line.

Go to Blog » The massive power plant under construction on muddy terrain on this Finnish island was supposed to be the showpiece of a nuclear renaissance. The most powerful reactor ever built, its modular design was supposed to make it faster and cheaper to build. And it was supposed to be safer, too.

But things have not gone as planned.

After four years of construction and thousands of defects and deficiencies, the reactor’s 3 billion euro price tag, about $4.2 billion, has climbed at least 50 percent. And while the reactor was originally meant to be completed this summer, Areva, the French company building it, and the utility that ordered it, are no longer willing to make certain predictions on when it will go online.

While the American nuclear industry has predicted clear sailing after its first plants are built, the problems in Europe suggest these obstacles may be hard to avoid.

A new fleet of reactors would be standardized down to “the carpeting and wallpaper,” as Michael J. Wallace, the chairman of UniStar Nuclear Energy — a joint venture between EDF Group and Constellation Energy, the Maryland-based utility — has said repeatedly.

In the end, he says, that standardization will lead to significant savings.

But early experience suggests these new reactors will be no easier or cheaper to build than the ones of a generation ago, when cost overruns — and then accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl — ended the last nuclear construction boom.

In Flamanville, France, a clone of the Finnish reactor now under construction is also behind schedule and overbudget.

In the United States, Florida and Georgia have changed state laws to raise electricity rates so that consumers will foot some of the bill for new nuclear plants in advance, before construction even begins.

“A number of U.S. companies have looked with trepidation on the situation in Finland and at the magnitude of the investment there,” said Paul L. Joskow, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a co-author of an influential report on the future of nuclear power in 2003. “The rollout of new nuclear reactors will be a good deal slower than a lot of people were assuming.”

For nuclear power to have a high impact on reducing greenhouse gases, an average of 12 reactors would have to be built worldwide each year until 2030, according to the Nuclear Energy Agency at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Right now, there are not even enough reactors under construction to replace those that are reaching the end of their lives.

And of the 45 reactors being built around the world, 22 have encountered construction delays, according to an analysis prepared this year for the German government by Mycle Schneider, an energy analyst and a critic of the nuclear industry. He added that nine do not have official start-up dates.

Most of the new construction is underway in countries like China and Russia, where strong central governments have made nuclear energy a national priority. India also has long seen nuclear as part of a national drive for self-sufficiency and now is seeking new nuclear technologies to reduce its reliance on imported uranium.

By comparison, “the state has been all over the place in the United States and Europe on nuclear power,” Mr. Joskow said.

The United States generates about one-fifth of its electricity from a fleet of 104 reactors, most built in the 1960s and 1970s. Coal still provides about half the country’s power.

To streamline construction, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Washington has worked with the industry to approve a handful of designs. Even so, the schedule to certify the most advanced model from Westinghouse, a unit of Toshiba, has slipped during an ongoing review of its ability to withstand the impact of an airliner.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also not yet approved the so-called EPR design under construction in Finland for the American market.

This month, the United States Energy Department produced a short list of four reactor projects eligible for some loan guarantees. In the 2005 energy bill, Congress provided $18.5 billion, but the industry’s hope of winning an additional $50 billion worth of loan guarantees evaporated when that money was stripped from President Obama’s economic stimulus bill.

The industry has had more success in getting states to help raise money. This year, authorities permitted Florida Power & Light to start charging millions of customers several dollars a month to finance four new reactors. Customers of Georgia Power, a subsidiary of the Southern Co., will pay on average $1.30 a month more in 2011, rising to $9.10 by 2017, to help pay for two reactors expected to go online in 2016 or later.

But resistance is mounting. In April, Missouri legislators balked at a preconstruction rate increase, prompting the state’s largest electric utility, Ameren UE, to suspend plans for a $6 billion copy of Areva’s Finnish reactor.

Areva, a conglomerate largely owned by the French state, is heir to that nation’s experience in building nuclear plants. France gets about 80 percent of its power from 58 reactors. But even France has not completed a new reactor since 1999.

After designing an updated plant originally called the European Pressurized Reactor with German participation during the 1990s, the French had trouble selling it at home because of a saturated energy market as well as opposition from Green Party members in the then-coalition government.

So Areva turned to Finland, where utilities and energy-hungry industries like pulp and paper had been lobbying for 15 years for more nuclear power. The project was initially budgeted at $4 billion and Teollisuuden Voima, the Finnish utility, pledged it would be ready in time to help the Finnish government meet its greenhouse gas targets under the Kyoto climate treaty, which runs through 2012.

Areva promised electricity from the reactor could be generated more cheaply than from natural gas plants. Areva also said its model would deliver 1,600 megawatts, or about 10 percent of Finnish power needs.

In 2001, the Finnish parliament narrowly approved construction of a reactor at Olkiluoto, an island on the Baltic Sea. Construction began four years later.

Serious problems first arose over the vast concrete base slab for the foundation of the reactor building, which the country’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority found too porous and prone to corrosion. Since then, the authority has blamed Areva for allowing inexperienced subcontractors to drill holes in the wrong places on a vast steel container that seals the reactor.

In December, the authority warned Anne Lauvergeon, the chief executive of Areva, that “the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons” at Areva was holding up work on safety systems.

Today, the site still teems with 4,000 workmen on round-the-clock shifts. Banners from dozens of subcontractors around Europe flutter in the breeze above temporary offices and makeshift canteens. Some 10,000 people speaking at least eight different languages have worked at the site. About 30 percent of the workforce is Polish, and communication has posed significant challenges.

Areva has acknowledged that the cost of a new reactor today would be as much as 6 billion euros, or $8 billion, double the price offered to the Finns. But Areva said it was not cutting any corners in Finland. The two sides have agreed to arbitration, where they are both claiming more than 1 billion euros in compensation. (Areva blames the Finnish authorities for impeding construction and increasing costs for work it agreed to complete at a fixed price.)

Areva announced a steep drop in earnings last year, which it blamed mostly on mounting losses from the project.

In addition, nuclear safety inspectors in France have found cracks in the concrete base and steel reinforcements in the wrong places at the site in Flamanville. They also have warned Électricité de France, the utility building the reactor, that welders working on the steel container were not properly qualified.

On top of such problems come the recession, weaker energy demand, tight credit and uncertainty over future policies, said Caren Byrd, an executive director of the global utility and power group at Morgan Stanley in New York.

“The warning lights now are flashing more brightly than just a year ago about the cost of new nuclear,” she said.

And Jouni Silvennoinen, the project manager at Olkiluoto, said, “We have had it easy here.” Olkiluoto is at least a geologically stable site. Earthquake risks in places like China and the United States or even the threat of storm surges mean building these reactors will be even trickier elsewhere.

Matthew L. Wald contributed reporting from Washington.