Info on U mining, Oil, Hard Rock mining: MSHA

Safety Informatio​n Posted - Hazard Alert: Heat Illness Prevention

Overexposure to heat can be a significant problem especially for miners in jobs that require heavy physical labor in hot or humid environments. Heat Stress occurs when internal body temperature is higher than 100 deg. F and significantly reduces workers’performance and can require medical attention. This alert describes how to recognize the risk factors and the signs and symptoms of heat stress. The best solution to dehydration and heat illness is PREVENTION!

Fatality #11 - May 1, 2014
Powered Haulage - Nevada - Gypsum
Silver State Minerals LLC - Gypsum Mountain
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On May 1, 2014, a 57-year-old co-owner with 1 year of experience was killed at a gypsum mine. The victim was driving an all terrain vehicle on the mine site to place signs around the perimeter of the mine. He lost control of the vehicle while traveling on a steep hill and it overturned onto him.

Fatality #10 - April 28, 2014
Machinery - Nevada - Gold Ore
Klondex Midas Mine Inc. - Midas Mine
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On April 28, 2014, a 53-year-old miner with 32 years of experience was killed at an underground gold mine. The victim was drilling with a jackleg drill when his clothing became entangled in the drill steel of the machine.

Fatality #9 - February 27, 2014
Fall of Person - Iowa - Crushed, Broken Limestone NEC
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. - Ames Mine
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On February 27, 2014, a 27-year-old contract mechanic with 2 years of experience was injured at an underground limestone mine. The victim was repairing a hydraulic pump on a scaler when fell from an attached walkway approximately five feet to the ground. He was airlifted to a hospital where he died the next day.

Fatality #15 - October 4, 2013
Powered Haulage - Underground - West Virginia
McElroy Coal Company - McElroy Mine
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Friday, October 4, 2013, a 62-year-old longwall maintenance coordinator, with 42 years of mining experience, was killed while supervising the face conveyor chain installation on a longwall set up.
MSHA News Release: [05/05/2014]
Contact: Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number 14-765-NAT

MSHA issues mine fatality data for the first quarter of 2014 Agency calls stakeholder summit to address recent spike in metal, nonmetal mining deaths

ARLINGTON, Va. – The U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration today released a summary of U.S. mining deaths that occurred during the first quarter of 2014. From Jan. 1 to March 31, eight miners died in accidents in the U.S. mining industry. Three were killed in coal mining accidents and five in metal and nonmetal mining accidents. The previous quarter was marked by 15 deaths and an increase in the metal and nonmetal sector.
MSHA News Release: [05/01/2014]
Contact: Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number 14-752-NAT

MSHA to convene stakeholder summit over spike in metal, nonmetal mining deaths
ARLINGTON, Va. – The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration will convene a meeting of mine industry stakeholders in the wake of a dramatic increase in metal and nonmetal mining deaths. The meeting will address the causes of recent deaths, identify actions needed to prevent them and work to reverse the trend.
MSHA News Release: [05/01/2014]
Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number 14-731-NAT

MSHA begins collaboration with mining industry on dust rule implementation
ARLINGTON, Va. –As part of its efforts to assure smooth implementation of thenew coal mine respirable dust rule, the U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration is forming a cooperative partnership with coal mine operators and miners.
MSHA News Release: [04/30/2014]
Contact: Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number 14-732-NAT

MSHA announces results of March impact inspections
ARLINGTON, Va. –The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration today announced that federal inspectors issued 152 citations, 14 orders and one safeguard during special impact inspections conducted at 10 coal mines and three metal and nonmetal mines in March.
Fatality #15 - October 4, 2013
Powered Haulage - Underground - West Virginia
McElroy Coal Company - McElroy Mine
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Friday, October 4, 2013, a 62-year-old longwall maintenance coordinator, with 42 years of mining experience, was killed while supervising the face conveyor chain installation on a longwall set up.

Fatality #7 -April 17, 2014
Machinery -Kansas - Construction Sand and Gravel
Hafenstine Construction - Hafenstine Plant #1
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY -On April 17, 2014, a 58-year-old truck driver with 3½ years of experience was killed at a sand and gravel mine. An excavator was loading material in a haul truck parked at the pit. When the victim exited the truck, he was struck by the excavator bucket and pinned against the truck.

Fatality #7 -April 17, 2014
Machinery -Kansas - Construction Sand and Gravel
Hafenstine Construction - Hafenstine Plant #1
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY -On April 17, 2014, a 58-year-old truck driver with 3½ years of experience was killed at a sand and gravel mine. An excavator was loading material in a haul truck parked at the pit. When the victim exited the truck, he was struck by the excavator bucket and pinned against the truck.

Fatality #13 - August 16, 2013
Machinery - Surface - Wyoming
Thunder Basin Coal Company LLC - Black Thunder
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Friday, August 16, 2013, a 24-year-old utility person with nearly 3 years of mining experience was killed when the Ford F350 utility pickup truck he was driving was crushed by a P&H 2800 electric shovel.

Fatality #18 - October 11, 2013
Powered Haulage - Underground - Indiana
Five Star Mining Inc. - Prosperity Mine
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Friday, October 11, 2013, a 59-year-old shuttle car operator, with approximately 22 years of mining experience, was killed when a shuttle car struck him. The victim was in the crosscut between the No. 6 and No. 7 entries. This crosscut and adjoining entries were being used to gain access to rooms being mined on the right side of the section.

Fatality #5 & Fatality #6-April 11, 2014
Fall of Rib. -Missouri - Lime
Mississippi Lime Company - Mississippi Lime Company-Ste. Genevieve
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY -On April 11, 2014, a 53-year-old scaler with 8 years of experience and a 29-year old scaler with 8 years of experience were killed at an underground limestone mine. The miners were in a basket on a boom truck scaling a pillar about 40 feet above the mine floor. Large slabs of rock fell from the rib and struck an outrigger and the back of the truck, causing the boom to fall to the mine floor.
MSHA News Release: [04/23/2014]
Contact: Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number: 14-0669-NAT
MSHA issues final rule on lowering miners' exposure to respirable coal dust

ARLINGTON, Va. —The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration today announced the release of afinal rule to lower miners' exposure to respirable coal mine dust in all underground and surface coal mines. The final rule continues the department's efforts through itsEnd Black Lung — Act Now! initiative to end black lung disease, a debilitating illness that continues to affect coal miners and their families. The final rule was announced during an event at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health facility in Morgantown, W.Va.


Fatality #15 - November 7, 2013
Powered Haulage – Georgia – Crushed, Broken Granite
Vulcan Construction Materials, L.P. - Lithia Springs
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On November 18, 2013, a 33-year old contract electrician foreman with 14 years of experience was injured at a crushed stone mine. The victim was working in a 480-volt electrical enclosure, pulling cable for a new pump that was being installed, when he contacted energized conductors. He was transported to a hospital where he died on November 22, 2013.

Fatality #20 - November 23, 2013
Machinery - Underground - Ohio
American Coal Corporation - Century Mine
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Saturday, November 23, 2013, a 32-year-old longwall shieldman with 5 years of mining experience was killed when he was struck by high pressure hydraulic fluid from a panline valve bank. The victim was advancing shields and the panline when a hydraulic hose extending from the panline to a shield was pinched between a shield pontoon and the mine floor. As the shields and panline advanced, a fitting on the hydraulic hose broke where it was attached to a panline valve bank.

Fatality #15 - November 7, 2013
Powered Haulage – Georgia – Crushed, Broken Granite
Vulcan Construction Materials, L.P. - Lithia Springs
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On November 7, 2013, a 46-year old equipment operator with 27 years of experience was killed at a granite mine. The victim was operating a haul truck when it veered off the left side of a haul road and traveled through a berm. The haul truck went over an embankment and overturned in a settling pond.

Fatality #4 - March 27, 2014
Falling/Sliding Material -Virginia - Construction Sand and Gravel
Baillio Sand Company Inc. - Lord Farm #5
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY – On March 27, 2014, a 64-year-old foreman with 32 years of experience was seriously injured when he was struck by a section of plastic water pipe as it was being moved by an excavator. The victim was transported to a hospital where he died on March 30, 2014, as a result of his injuries.

MSHA News Release: [04/03/2014]
Contact: Lauren North
Phone: (202) 693-4655
Release Number 14-539-NAT

MSHA issues guidance on implementing effective corrective action programs
ARLINGTON, Va. – The U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration today issued a Program Information Bulletin reminding the mining community of the process for submitting a corrective action program for MSHA approval and the tools MSHA makes available to assist mine operators in monitoring compliance.
Fatality #3 – March 25, 2014Machinery – Underground - Indiana
Gibson County Coal LLC – Gibson Mine
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, at approximately 1:45 a.m., a 41-year-old mechanic trainee with 23 weeks of mining experience was killed while working on a belt feeder. The victim was cutting through the inner left side plate of the crawler assembly that connects the hopper jack assemblies to the crawler frame. When the cut was completed, the crawler assembly pivoted upward, pinning the victim between the crawler track and the frame of the feeder.
Fatality #14 - October 17, 2013Lebec Cement Plant
National Cement Company of California, Inc.
Lebec, Kern County, California
METAL/NONMETAL MINE FATALITY - On October 17, 2013, Fernando Rivera, Journeyman Electrician, age 52, was seriously injured when he fell from a step ladder approximately six feet onto a concrete pad below. Rivera was standing on the ladder pulling electrical cable into a cable tray located on the outside of the building. The cable tray struck the step ladder after a mounting bracket broke loose, causing Rivera to fall onto the concrete pad. Rivera was transported to a hospital where he died on October 18, 2013, as a result of his injuries. Rivera was wearing a hard hat at the time of the accident.

Rules or Regulation​s Posted - Reissue of P11-IV-01 Examinatio​n of working places (30 C.F.R. §§ 56/57.1800​2)

Who needs this information?
This Program Policy Letter (PPL) applies to surface and underground metal and nonmetal mine operators, contractors, equipment manufacturers, miners, miners' representatives, and Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health enforcement personnel.
What is the purpose of this bulletin?

The purpose of this PPL is to clarify that the examination of working places required under 30 C.F.R. §§ 56/57.18002 includes the requirement that the operator shall examine each working place at least once each shift for conditions which adversely affect safety or health and a record of the examination be maintained which shall be made available for review by the Secretary or his authorized representative.

MSHA - News Release - MSHA announces results of February impact inspection​

Release: [03/27/2014]
Contact: Amy Louviere
Phone: (202) 693-9423
Release Number 14-527-NAT

MSHA announces results of February impact inspections
ARLINGTON, Va.The U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration today announced that federal inspectors issued 210 citations, eight orders and one safeguard during special impact inspections conducted at nine coal mines and three metal and nonmetal mines in February. A safeguard is written when an unsafe haulage or hoisting hazard is observed and is an immediate risk to a miner.

Fatality #3 – March 25, 2014 Machinery – Underground - Indiana Gibson County Coal LLC – Gibson Mine COAL MINE FATALITY - On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, at approximately 1:45 a.m., a 41-year-old mechanic trainee with 23 weeks of mining experience was killed while working on a belt feeder. The victim was cutting through the inner left side plate of the crawler assembly that connects the hopper jack assemblies to the crawler frame. When the cut was completed, the crawler assembly pivoted upward, pinning the victim between the crawler track and the frame of the feeder.

Fatality #12 - October 17, 2013Huff Creek No. 1
Lone Mountain Processing, Inc.
AHolmes Mill, Harlan County, Kentucky
COAL MINE FATALITY - On Tuesday, August 6, 2013, a 56-year old Continuous Mining Machine Operator was killed by a coal/rock burst at Lone Mountain Processing, Inc.’s Huff Creek No. 1 Mine. A 48-year old Mobile Bridge Carrier (MBC) Operator received serious injuries and a 49-year old Mobile Roof Support (MRS) Operator received minor injuries. The 006 Mechanized Mining Unit (MMU) crew was retreat mining when the coal/rock burst occurred.

Energy Fuels Resources Inc. Forced to Close Uranium Mines Near Grand Canyon
• November 22, 2013

Uranium Mine Threatening Sacred Site at Grand Canyon Temporarily Halted

Production slump caps a horror year for ERA

Reminder..​.uranium is still considered mineral mining§ 45.1-161.311:1. Consent required before working mine near land of another.
No owner or tenant of any land containing minerals, within this Commonwealth, shall open or sink, dig, excavate or work in any mine on such land within five feet of the line dividing such land from that of another person, without the consent, in writing, of every person interested in or having title to such adjoining lands or mineral rights in possession, reversion or remainder, or of the guardian of any such person that may be under a disability. If any person violates this section, he shall forfeit $500 to any person injured by such activity and to anyone whose consent is required but not obtained.
(1997, c. 390.)


Groups ask EPA for broad mining review

A coalition of environmental, business, faith, American Indian and conservation groups Monday called on the federal Environmental Protection Agency to conduct a broad, region-wide study of the cumulative effects of mining expansion in the Lake Superior basin.The 59 groups from Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan sent a letter to Susan Hedman, administrator of the EPA’s Region 5 based in Chicago, urging a study of how multiple new mining projects might combine to adversely impact Lake Superior.
The groups want the EPA to look at what impact existing mining has on the regional ecology, including the impact of toxic mercury in the environment, the contribution regional mining makes to that mercury load and how adding more mining might increase mercury.
An official from Hedman’s office said they have received the letter and are reviewing it. They declined to comment further.

Canada accused of ignoring NAFTA obligations by environmental law association PDF Print E-mail
Earth News
Posted by Joan Russow   
Thursday, 15 August 2013 13:58
Canada has so weakened its environmental laws that it is “in violation” of its obligations under the North American free-trade agreement, the West Coast Environmental Law association says.
In an open letter released Wednesday, the non-profit legal foundation asks the Commission for Environmental Cooperation to take a hard look at Canada’s actions, saying the government has exposed the environment to undue risk to give Canadian industry an edge over the U.S. and Mexico.

Earthquakes:   Man-Made Earthquakes : Earthquakes can be induced by surface and underground mining

Analysis of 2011 Virginia Earthquake Suggests Seismic Risk:  The large ground motions also triggered rockfalls over an unexpectedly large area. They were reported as far as 245 km away. Quakes this size shouldn’t trigger landslides more than 60 km away from its epicenter:


Louisa County Earthquake: August 23, 2011:  In the images above, you will notice that the seismograms from station URVA look much different than the other stations' seismograms. This is because URVA's seismometer went "off-scale" — the earthquake's shear wave caused more intense ground motion at the station's location in Richmond than the seismometer was designed for:


Mines break laws:

Uranium Watch — Utah Bulletin
Volume 6 | No. 3 | July 2O1
RADON FLUX: The White Mesa Uranium Mill is out of compliance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for radon emissions from Operating Uranium Mill Tailings Impoundments (40 C.F.R. Part 61 Subpart W).  The 2012 radon flux from tailings Cell 2 exceeded the 20 picoCuries per-square-meter-per-second (20 pCi/m²/sec) standard.  The 2012 radon flux was 25.8 pCi/m²/sec, more than a 25% increase.  The Utah Department of Air Quality (DAQ) enforces the EPA radionuclide National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS).
Energy Fuels Resources (USA) Inc. (Energy Fuels) determined that the increase in emissions was caused by the dewatering of the tailings.  The tailings must be dewatered to reduce the potential for leakage from the impoundment and so that the pile will settle before the placement of the final radon barrier.
Tailings are no longer being placed in the 67-acre Cell 2 impoundment. Dewatering of the tailings began a few years ago.  In the past, water on top of the tailings and in the tailings reduced the radon emissions.  As the water is removed from the tailings, the radon emissions have continued to increase, even though there is an interim soil cover on top of the pile.  The DAQ has determined that Energy Fuels must submit monthly radon flux reports, starting in April. 
Energy Fuels proposed a test-scale application to confirm the effect of the addition of one foot of additional soil cover.  If test achieves the desired result, Energy Fuels plans to  will apply one foot of additional random fill to the remainder of Cell 2, on or before July 1, 2014.  Energy Fuels proposed the addition of 1 foot of fill, even though they determined that 1 foot of fill would only bring Cell 2 into compliance during the next year, and it would take at least 2 feet to  reduce surface radon flux to below 20 pCi/m²/sec, regardless of the depth of dewatered tailings. So, the radon emissions from Call 2 will likely exceed the standard for some years to come.  
TAILINGS IMPOUNDMENTS:  The White Mesa Mill is also out of compliance with the limitations on the number of tailings impoundments in operation at any one time.  EPA regulation (40 C.F.R. 61.252(b)(1)) only allows the operation of two tailings impoundments at any one time.  In the past the regulators and the mill owner have only counted the impoundments receiving solid tailings, but the impoundments receiving liquids also count as operational impoundments.  The Miil has 5 operational impoundments: Cells 1, 3, 4A, 4B, and Roberts Pond.  Though Cell 2 is not receiving tailings, it should also be considered to be an operational impoundment.  The EPA has determined that the Mill is out of compliance with the requirement for only 2 operational impoundments, but it is unclear how the Mill will be required to come into compliance.  
The Utah Division of Radiation Control is in the process of developing a rulemaking to amend their Administrative Procedures to conform to the hearing procedures required in the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C § 2021(o)(3)(A).  This rulemaking is in response to a Uranium Watch allegation submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission alleging that the DRC had not been in compliance with the requirement for hearings, with a transcript and opportunity for cross-examination, for uranium mill and tailings impoundment agency actions. The hearings are to be held PRIOR to final agency actions.  In the past the DRC has held hearings for some proposed amendments to the White Mesa Mill and other uranium mill (Lisbon Valley and Shootaring Canyon Mills) or 11e.(2) byproduct material impoundments (EnergySolutions), but there was no transcript and no opportunity for cross examination of either the staff or the licensee for those public hearings.  
• DANEROS URANIUM MINE:  Energy Fuels has submitted a Plan of Operation (POO) to expand the Daneros Mine to a 65-acre large mining operation.  The BLM will commence  a process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when they have received all the information they need to review the POO.
• DOE URANIUM LEASING PROGRAM:  The comment period for the Department of Energy (DOE) Uranium Leasing Program (ULP) Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement closed July 1.  UW found numerous flaws in the DPEIS, including the failure of the DOE to assess all of the previous impacts at the ULP mine sites and the failure to consider the impacts from the extensive periods of non-operation.
•  DOE ABANDONED MINE REPORT: The DOE must develop a report on the abandoned uranium mines associated with the Atomic Energy Commission ore buying program.  There are hundreds of such mines in the 4-Corners area, particularly in SE Utah and SW Colorado.  The Report is due in mid-2014.  For more Information and to submit information to the DOE:

Uranium Milling and the Church Rock Disaster

Church Rock, New Mexico, would seem an improbable spot for a nuclear disaster. A dusty cluster of industrial machinery set in the arid mesas of the great Southwest, its most distinguishing feature might be considered a large pond of murky liquid, unusual in such dry terrain. Church Rock also hosts a series of underground uranium mine shafts, a mill, and a scattered community of Navajo families who survive by herding cattle, goats, and sheep.
A deep gully leads from the mine site into the Rio Puerco, which once flowed only when fed by spring rains. Now it is wet year round, bolstered by water pumped from the mine shafts to keep them from flooding. That water flowing from the mine is laced with radioactive isotopes. And the pond hides a burden of contaminated waste. The 350 families who water livestock in the Rio Puerco rely on their small herds to eke out a meager existence. Many are members of the Dine--Navajo--Nation, with incomes in the range of two thousand dollars per year. During the hot days of the desert summer local children would play in the stream as their parents tended the goats, sheep, and cattle.
A Wall of Radioactive Water
In the early morning hours of July 16, 1979--fourteen weeks after the accident at Three Mile Island--all of that changed. The dam at Church Rock burst sending eleven hundred tons of radioactive mill wastes and ninety million gallons of contaminated liquid pouring toward Arizona. The wall of water backed up sewers and lifted manhole covers in Gallup, twenty miles downstream, and caught people all along the river unawares. "There were no clouds, but all of a sudden the water came," remembered Herbert Morgan of Manuelito, New Mexico. "I was wondering where it came from. Not for a few days were we told."[1] No one was killed in the actual flood. But along the way it left residues of radioactive uranium, thorium, radium, and polonium, as well as traces of metals such as cadmium, aluminum, magnesium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, selenium, sodium, vanadium, zinc, iron, lead and high concentrations of sulfates.[2] The spill degraded the western Rio Puerco as a water source. It carried toxic metals already detectable at least seventy miles downstream.[3] And it raised the specter that uranium mining in the Colorado River Basin may be endangering Arizona's Lake Mead, and with it the drinking water of Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and much of Arizona. Except for the bomb tests, Church Rock was probably the biggest single release of radioactive poisons on American soil. Ironically it occurred thirty-four years to the day after the first atomic test explosion at Trinity, New Mexico, not far away. The source of the catastrophe was uranium mill wastes. Usable uranium is extracted from the sandstone in which it is usually found by grinding it fine and leaching it with sulfuric acid. The acid carries off the desired isotopes. But the leftover waste sands--"tailings"--still contain 85 percent of the ore's original radioactivity, and 99.9 percent of its original volume. There are now some 140 million tons of them scattered around the West. NRC commissioner Victor Gilinsky and others consider them "the dominant contribution to radiation exposure" of the entire nuclear fuel cycle.[4] The acid milling liquids--called "liquor"--also dissolve dangerous traces of thorium 230, radium 222, lead 210, and other isotopes. Because of their high radioactivity the tailings and liquor both must be isolated from the environment--but nobody has yet demonstrated a method with any long-term success. At Church Rock several hundred million gallons of the liquor were being held in a large pond so the liquids could evaporate off and the solid tailings be stored. The whole complex was owned by the United Nuclear Corporation (UNC), a Virginia-based firm with assets in the hundreds of millions of dollars and influence in the New Mexico state government. Its dam and pond at Church Rock were opened with the understanding that they would operate just eighteen months; twenty-five months later, at the time of the accident, no alternative sites were being developed. The UNC dam wall was an earthen structure with a clay core, twenty-five feet high and thirty feet wide. On the morning of the accident a twenty-foot-wide section of it gave way, wreaking havoc downstream. In the desert, water is synonymous with life. In contaminating the Rio Puerco, UNC had threatened the basis of existence for all of the people who lived downstream. For the first time they confronted the terrors of radioactivity. "Our hearts have been broken," said Bodie McCray of Tsayotah. "We don't sleep worrying about it. I worry about our children and their children." Indeed the hundreds of families living near the spill now had to live with the same kinds of uncertainties just beginning to plague the people of central Pennsylvania. "Ever since the accident we've been wanting the truth," said Kee Bennally, a silversmith playing a lead role in the multimillion-dollar lawsuit against UNC. "They say it's not dangerous and in a couple of days they say it is dangerous. It's been really confusing, especially for the old people. They don't know anything about this, the contamination, the radiation. . . ."[5] What made the Church Rock disaster especially tragic was that it could have been avoided. Soon after the spill an angry U.S. representative Morris Udall (D-Ariz.) told a congressional hearing that "at least three and possibly more Federal and state regulatory agencies had ample opportunity to conclude that such an accident was likely to occur." Even before the dam had been licensed "the company's own consultant predicted that the soil under this dam was susceptible to extreme settling which was likely to cause [its] cracking and subsequent failure."[6] Cracks had developed in the dam the year it opened, said Udall. Aerial photographs revealed that liquor, which was supposed to be kept away from the dam face, was lapping against it. State-required seepage devices and monitoring wells had never been built or inspected for.[7] UNC's chief operating officer, J. David Hann, countered Udall by blaming the accident on "a unique rock point, beneath the breach." Because the dam had been built partly on bedrock and partly on softer ground, that rock point "served as a fulcrum, resulting in transverse cracking." The breach was "like many things you undertake," Hann told the congressional hearing. "They have a risk, and we undertook this. There was a circumstance that was not foreseen at the time."[8] But coming in the wake of Three Mile Island, and in light of considerable evidence of impending disaster, Hann's arguments seemed to carry little weight. In a special report the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers charged that if the dam had been built to legal specifications, according to approved design, "it is possible that the failure would not have occurred."[9] And a spokesman from the New Mexico State Engineer's Office added that a "consensus" of engineers who reviewed the accident agreed that "had the drain zone been constructed according to the approved plans and specifications, and had the tailings beach been in place as recommended by [UNC's] engineers, it is likely that failure would not have occurred."[10] At the time of the disaster the dam was carrying a load of tailings liquor at least two feet higher than allowed for in its designs. The company had also failed to tell the state that cracking had been observed. "There were significant warnings appearing before the dam broke," said William Dircks, director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. "I think that is the troubling part of it."[11] Ultimately, for the company, the accident would mean a loss of some revenue and bad publicity. For the people downstream life itself was at stake. "Somehow," complained Frank Paul, vice-president of the Navajo Tribal Council, "United Nuclear Corporation was permitted to locate a tailings pond and a dam on an unstable geologic formation. Somehow UNC was allowed to design an unsafe tailings dam not in conformance to its own design criteria. Somehow UNC was permitted to inadequately deal with warning cracks that had appeared over two years prior to the date the dam failed. Somehow UNC was permitted to continue a temporary dam for six months beyond its design life. Somehow UNC was permitted to have a tailings dam without either an adequate contingency plan or sufficient men and material in place to deal with a spill. Somehow UNC was permitted to deal with the spill by doing almost nothing."[12] Ironically the Church Rock dam was a "state-of-the-art" structure. Paul Robinson, an Albuquerque-based expert on mining issues, warned the Udall hearings that "UNC-Church Rock was the most recently built and the most carefully engineered tailings dam in the state." Similar dams owned by Anaconda, Kerr-McGee, UNC-Homestake Partners, and Sohio were "disasters waiting to happen."[13]

1. Kathie Saltzstein, "Navajos Ask $12.5 Million in UNC Suits," Gallup Independent, August 14, 1980 (hereafter cited as "Navajos"); for a general analysis of the relationship between Indians and uranium development, see Joseph G. Jorgenson, et al., "Native Americans and Energy Development" (Cambridge, Ma.: Anthropology Resources Center, 1978); for a broad range of information on the issue of uranium mining and milling, contact the Black Hills Alliance, Box 2508, Rapid City, SD 57709.
2. Edwin K. Swanson, "Water Quality Problems in the Puerco River," paper presented at the American Water Resources Association Symposium, Water Quality Monitoring and Management, Tucson, Arizona, October 24, 1980. 3. Edwin K. Swanson, interview, May 1981. 4. Victor Gilinsky, "The Problem of Uranium Mill Tailings," paper presented at the Pacific Southwest Minerals and Energy Conference, Anaheim, California, May 2, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: NRC Office of Public Affairs), No. S-78-3, p. 3 (hereafter cited as "Problem"). See also, EPA, Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Part I--Fuel Supply, EPA-520/9-73-003-B, Washington, D.C: EPA Office of Radiation Programs, 1973, p. 26. 5. Chris Shuey, "Calamity at Church Rock, New Mexico," Saturday Magazine, Scottsdale Daily Progress, Part 1, February 14, 1981, p. 3 (hereafter cited as "Calamity"). 6. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Mill Tailings Dam Break at Church Rock, New Mexico, 96th Congress, October 22, 1979, pp. 1-4 (hereafter cited as Church Rock Hearings). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., p. 120. 9. Ibid., p. 3. 10. Ibid., p. 42. 11. Ibid., p. 39. 12. Ibid., p. 8.

13. Ibid., pp. 225-232.

Thorium and Other Damage
Soon after the spill UNC sent small crews downstream with shovels and fifty-five-gallon drums to begin cleaning up. Bitter complaints from local residents and the state soon forced UNC to expand its crews to thirty to thirty-five workers. "We have removed more than 3500 tons of potentially affected sediment from the streambed to a distance of more than 10 miles from the mill," Hann told the Udall hearings. "The combination of these clean-up efforts, and natural effects, such as rain, have largely restored normal conditions in the area."[14] But an Arizona water-quality official complained in an interview with us that the rains had merely transported the pollutants into his state.[15] And Robinson pointed out that UNC had in fact removed just 1 percent of the tailings and liquid known to have spilled from the dam. More than eighteen months after the accident indications were strong that radiation and other pollutants had penetrated thirty feet into the earth. A report by a Cincinnati-based firm brought in as a consultant by the EPA warned that at least two nearby aquifers had been put "at risk."[16] Furthermore when the spill overflowed the banks of the Rio Puerco, it left behind a series of pools. When ordered by the state to monitor them, UNC chose to look for their uranium content. But uranium was precisely what the company had been working to remove in the milling process. "It was a subterfuge on the company's part," said Dr. Jorge Winterer, an M.D. working with the Indian Health Service in Gallup at the time of the spill. "There were children up and down the river playing in those stagnant pools, and they were deadly poisonous. But UNC chose to monitor them for the element they knew was least likely to be there."[17] In fact the NRC's William Dircks told the Udall hearing that those pools showed levels of radiation one hundred to five hundred times natural background. What UNC might have missed were substantial quantities of thorium 230 and radium 226. Both are alpha-emitters and are extremely dangerous if ingested or inhaled. Thorium 230, for example, has a half-life of eighty thousand years and is believed by some to be as toxic as plutonium. A silver-white metal, thorium tends to deposit in the liver, bone marrow, and lymphatic tissue, where even minute quantities can cause cancer and leukemia. If inhaled as dust it can cause lung cancer. According to a study by Winterer, under some circumstances thorium can become "trapped" in the body, making it "a permanent source of radiation" there, and thus doing untold damage to the human organism.[18] Winterer soon came under personal attack in the wake of his candid comments. UNC was a power in state politics. It had twenty-three hundred employees and an annual budget within New Mexico of $140 million.[19] When Winterer contradicted assertions from his superiors that there were no health effects from the spill, he was threatened with legal action. And when he began holding seminars in the local library on the dangers of radiation, Winterer was told by a former friend that he and his family "would be a lot better off if we got out of New Mexico right away."[20] Jorge Winterer was not the only one concerned about UNC's assessment of the spill. Dr. Thomas Gesell, a health physics professor at the University of Texas School of Public Health, and a staff member of the Presidential Kemeny Commission on the effects of the accident at Three Mile Island, also testified at the Udall hearings. Gesell said UNC's monitoring data were self-contradictory and out-of-phase with the state's. One UNC report had listed background levels as being lower after the spill than before it. Some company reports on downstream radiation levels claimed findings 150 times lower than the state's.[21] Meanwhile contamination had apparently spread to local animals. One veterinarian told a documentary crew from Eleventh Hour Films that abnormal radiation levels had been found in the tissues of goats and sheep that were drinking Rio Puerco water.[22] A study of eleven animals by the Center for Disease Control confirmed the problem. The CDC warned that kidneys and livers of local livestock might concentrate high doses and should not be eaten. The CDC also warned locals not to drink water from the river, and to avoid its banks during windstorms, when radioactive particles might be more easily inhaled. The CDC emphasized that radiation levels in local animals did not exceed New Mexico standards. But it was important to exercise caution because "the health risks of low doses of radiation" were "not completely understood."[23] A year after the spill Cubia Clayton of the state's Environmental Improvement Division confirmed that the Rio Puerco was still too dangerous for human or animal consumption. Clayton stated that it was "obvious" that "there has been some buildup of radiation" in some of the animals tested.[24] Ironically some of those animals had drunk upstream of the spill, indicating the stream--fed by water pumped out of the uranium mines--may well have been contaminated even before the accident. Soon after the dam break, two West German radiation biologists, Bernd Franke and Barbara Steinhilber-Schwab, sharply criticized the CDC report for downplaying the potential dangers of the accident and for sampling too few of the local livestock. They urged chromosome checks on area residents and called for the establishment of cancer and birth registries as well as intense ongoing radiation monitoring in the area. They also warned that thorium and other isotopes from the spill could enter the human body not only through eating contaminated animals, but also when radioactive dust settled on vegetables.[25] Dr. Carl Johnson, director of Colorado's Jefferson County Health Department, further warned that detectable radiation levels in the tissues of children might only surface "over a period of many years." Dangerous levels of thorium, radium, and other isotopes could build up through the ingestion of contaminated food, air, and water. Thus he too urged careful monitoring of local children, plus a shutdown of the mines and mills until the public had determined that "a satisfactory method for preventing a subsequent incident" had been found.[26] But the UNC mine and mill were back in operation in less than five months. The same pond was in use. Some changes were made in the dam, but constant seepage--up to eighty thousand gallons of contaminated liquid per day--had become a mainstay.[27] UNC had promised to provide local residents and their animals with clean drinking water. But an Arizona newspaper confirmed that the company was delivering just half the promised amounts.[28] A request by some of the downstream residents for emergency food stamps to replace their lost livestock was denied by the government. And at least one family was forced to eat a sheep known to have ingested radioactive residues. "If you come to Lupton, you will see a lot of shepherds running along the side of the wash trying to keep the sheep out," said Navajo shepherd Tom Charlie. The UNC had put up signs saying "contaminated wash, keep out. But our cows, sheep and horses can't read that. Most of us can't read, write or speak English. The signs do no good. If [neighbors] know we are from the Rio Puerco wash, they won't shake our hands," he added. "They think we have a high level of radiation. They ran from me. They are afraid of us. That's why people look at us, that's why no one comes to help us. It is wet now, but on days when it dries up, the wind will come along. The dust settles on the grass. The sheep eat it. We eat the sheep. We wonder what that does to our lives."[29]

14. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
15. Swanson interview. 16. Paul Robinson, interview, February 1981; and Shuey, "Calamity," Part 2, February 21, 1981, p. 5. 17. Jorge Winterer, interview, October 1980. 18. Jorge Winterer, Potential Health Impact of United Nuclear-Church Rock Spill (Gallup, N.M.: Physicians for Social Responsibility: fall 1979). 19. Church Rock Hearings, pp. 9-11. 20. Winterer interview. 21. Church Rock Hearings, pp. 9-11. 22. Allan Shauffler, interviewed for In Our Own Back Yard. 23. Albuquerque Journal, July 17, 1980. 24. Gallup Independent, June 16, 1980. 25. Bernd Franke and Barbara Steinhilber-Schwab, press statement, Albuquerque International Airport, Albuquerque, N.M., July 24, 1980. The question of contamination in local humans did come up when seven local residents were sent to Los Alamos for testing. Seven months later reports indicated no contamination. But it was soon discovered that the equipment used to measure the radiation levels was not capable of recording small doses--doses that were nonetheless large enough to do harm. See Shuey, "Calamity," Part 2, pp. 5-6. 26. Carl Johnson, letter to Lynda Taylor, July 14, 1980. 27. Robinson interview. 28. Shuey, "Calamity," Part 2, p. 6.

29. Saltzstein, "Navajos." In a July 1981 letter to authors, Edwin Swanson said the state of Arizona asked UNC to post signs along the river as far as Navajo, Arizona, but that the company did not do it.

Tailings Forever
Church Rock was the biggest tailings spill on record, but it was not the only one. And though the Navajo and other New Mexicans nearby were the most directly affected, people as far away as Los Angeles had cause for concern. As Congressman Udall put it, Church Rock fit a pattern of "sloppy and haphazard" handling of mill tailings throughout the nation. Other spills, he said, had dumped "millions of gallons of hazardous liquids" and jeopardized the water supply of much of the West.[30] In fact NRC statistics acknowledged at least fifteen accidental releases of tailings solution from 1959 to 1977, including seven dam breaks, six pipeline failures, and two floods. In at least ten of the events radioactivity reached a major watercourse.[31] One accident cited by Udall sent twenty-five thousand gallons of slurry directly into the Colorado River. A flood washed some fourteen thousand tons of tailings directly into Utah's Green River.[32] At Durango, Colorado, a huge hundred-foot-high tailings pile sits just sixty feet from the Animas River, a tributary of the Colorado. The state Department of Health has found abnormal radium levels in water thirty miles downstream.[33] According to Washington-based uranium expert David Berick operators of the Durango mill "just took the residues and threw them in the river. There's really no way of knowing how much of it went how far downstream."[34] Because the milling process renders many of the isotopes in the tailings highly soluble, they can be washed into streams and water tables by rain. A 1979 Oak Ridge National Laboratory study noted groundwater contamination at two New Mexico tailings piles.[35] Company records admit to severe groundwater contamination at Colorado's Uravan mill.[36] One tailings dam near Wyoming's Sweetwater River failed six times between 1957 and 1979 and was reporting a daily seepage rate of 1.7 million gallons.[37] And a major 1976 EPA study indicated that some 200,000 kilograms of dissolved uranium had been introduced to subsurface water by seepage and "direct injection" at mills belonging to Anaconda and Kerr-McGee. The study warned the problem was widespread: "The stark contrast between a typical 20-year mill life and an 80,000-year half life for the dominant radionuclide (thorium 230) necessitates a much greater forward look than is now evident in waste disposal practices and preservation of ground-water quality."[38] Nor has the problem stayed underground. As early as 1964 the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration told a congressional hearing that fish caught downriver from the Naturita and Uravan uranium mills showed higher radium concentrations than those caught upriver. Downriver hay samples also showed contamination, as did cows' milk. "In this case," said the authorities, "the prime source of radium intake for the cows is believed to be from eating hay irrigated with contaminated river water."[39] As for Church Rock, Edwin Swanson, a water-quality expert for the state of Arizona, told us traces of the spill--though dilute and possibly undetectable--would eventually reach Arizona's Lake Mead, 470 miles downstream.[40] And though most of America's uranium mills seem far removed from major population centers, concern is growing for such crucial water sources as Lake Mead, which supplies southern California, Las Vegas, and parts of Arizona with much of their drinking water. The huge reservoir sits downstream from numerous uranium mining and milling operations. The distances are sometimes great, but so are the half-lives of many of the isotopes slowly making their way downriver. As early as 1972, H. Peter Metzger, writing in The Atomic Establishment, warned that bottom sediments in Lake Mead were showing three times the concentration of radium as similar sediment samples taken upstream of the uranium mills.[41] The implications of a contaminated Lake Mead, and of a radioactive western water system, are catastrophic. But the uranium problem involves an immense volume of tailings and is not limited just to water quality. According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO) at least twenty-two uranium mills had shut down on the continental United States by 1978. They left behind some twenty-five million tons of tailings in "unattended piles and ponds" in eight western states plus Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Another sixteen mills were in operation, with an additional 115 million tons on site--bringing the total to 140 million tons. In the early 1980s another six to ten million tons of tailings were being produced per year. Based on high growth estimates, the NRC in 1981 predicted another 109 mills could be operating by the year 2000 producing 470 million more tons of tailings and scores of acid ponds like the one at Church Rock.[42] One estimate from Los Alamos Laboratory put the total far higher, predicting 900 million tons of tailings by the year 2000 in New Mexico alone.[43] Such a total would involve some twenty trillion cubic feet of tailings. And the piles threaten air as well as water, a problem considered by many experts--including NRC Commissioner Gilinsky--even more serious than the better-known "high-level" wastes from reactors and bomb factories. The reason is radon gas, the same deadly substance that has caused a five-fold increase in lung cancer among uranium miners. Because radon is a gas, it is possible, as Gilinsky said, "for large populations thousands of miles away from the source to be exposed, albeit to an extremely low dose."[44] In fact the NRC has attempted to present long-term calculations for New Mexico tailings-gas emission levels in such distant locations as Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Washington, D.C., and New York City.[45] NRC staff member Reginald Gotchy told us that despite its short half-life (3.8 days) radon gas from a tailings pile in New Mexico can carry to the East Coast of the United States. On its way contamination would appear "on grain grown in the Midwest" and elsewhere. "This stuff," he said, "goes everywhere." Gotchy hastened to add that he and the NRC consider the doses "minuscule."[46] But in 1977 Dr. Chauncy Kepford, a chemist based in State College, Pennsylvania, testified during hearings on the license for Three Mile Island Unit 2 (which caused the 1979 accident) that the quantity and health effects of radon tailings emissions had been vastly underestimated. Kepford stated that the NRC had failed to account for continued emissions over the full decay chains of the elements involved. Assuming a stable human population and society, he estimated that tailings from the fuel needed to operate TMI-2 for just one year could cause a million cancer cases over time.[47] In 1978 Dr. William Lochstet of Pennsylvania State University argued that the operation of a single uranium mine could result in 8.5 million deaths over time.[48] And Dr. Robert O. Pohl of Cornell told the NRC that the potential health effects from mill tailings could "completely dwarf" those from the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle and add significantly to the worldwide toll of death and mutations.[49] The essence of those conclusions was substantiated, surprisingly, from within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself. In the fall of 1977 Dr. Walter H. Jordan of the commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board wrote an internal memorandum arguing that the NRC "had underestimated radon emissions from tailings piles by a factor of 100,000." Because of the long half-lives of the isotopes in the solid tailings, radiation will continue to be emitted from the tailings piles for billions of years. Said Jordan: "It is very difficult to argue that deaths to future generations are unimportant."[50]

In estimating the long-term effects of radon gases, the NRC assumed the tailings piles would be covered with dirt. The belief is that covering the piles will trap the gas and force it--after its relatively short half-life--to deposit its radioactive "daughters" in the form of less mobile solids. But questions have been raised about how long dirt covering the piles would last through the millennia the tailings will be radioactive. Or if the piles can actually be covered at all. In some instances they are a hundred feet high and more, and cover hundreds of acres of ground. Huge strip-mining operations would be required just to get enough soil to do the job.[51] The NRC has also considered returning the tailings to the mines from which they came. In some instances the procedure may be viable. But many workers would be contaminated in the process, and much fuel consumed. One estimate for removing the Durango tailings involves 65,860 trips with twenty-five-ton dump trucks. Returning the 140 million tons of tailings now lying around the U.S. would require more than 5.5 million such truck trips.[52] In the meantime NRC Commissioner Gilinsky has warned that "none of the abandoned sites can be considered to be in satisfactory condition from the long-term standpoint."[53] In fact most of the piles continue to lie exposed to the winds and rain. Residents of Durango, Colorado, have experienced plumes of dust towering thousands of feet in the air, covering cars and houses with radioactive dust. Children have played in the "dunes." The piles were "the biggest, best sandpile in the world," Greta Highland of Durango told the High Country News. "After school my friends would sneak into the mill yard and play in the tailings."[54] But the consequences may be lethal. High levels of background radiation from thorium, for example, have been linked to spontaneous abortion and mental retardation.[55] Leukemia and lung-cancer rates in south Durango, near the piles, have been reported higher than the rest of the town and the state.[56] And Monticello, Utah (population: 1900), has also reported problems. From 1949 to 1960 the town hosted a large uranium mill, which processed weapons material for the AEC. In the mid-1960s four young residents died of leukemia. A fifth began a long battle against it. In a normal town Monticello's size just one case would be expected every twenty-five years. A preliminary study by the Center for Disease Control concluded that "there appears to be no relationship" between the mill and the leukemias. But the authors conceded that such a high leukemia incidence "would be expected to occur in fewer than one of 1,000 towns this size or smaller during the same period of time." The report also said that gamma readings at the perimeter of the tailings areas "ranged up to twenty times background" and that "a nuisance and possibly a hazard also existed due to blowing of the tailings as they dried out."[57] All five of the young victims had grown up within a half mile of the mill. "For a place this small, it had to be something," said Dale Maughan, whose son Alan died of leukemia in 1966, at age sixteen.[58] The damage has not been limited to humans. Farmers near the Cotter mill at Canon City, Colorado, have also complained of unexplained problems with their animals, problems reminiscent of those reported by Lloyd Mixon at Rocky Flats. Local residents Clarence Ransome and Wanda Bosco told us the illnesses among their livestock included diarrhea, weight loss, hair falling out, and difficulties in reproduction. Tests discovered contamination in at least one local well and in alfalfa being raised nearby. Bosco told us the problems with her animals disappeared when they were given uncontaminated water trucked in from town.[59] The presence of uranium mining and milling has also been linked to high birth-defect rates in the states of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah. Overall conclusions are tenuous, complicated by a wide range of social and environmental factors. But Dr. Alan Goodman, director of Program Development for the Area Health Education Center at the University of New Mexico's School of Medicine, has cited "a disturbing pattern" of sex ratio changes and birth defects that correspond to "the same patterns of uranium mining and milling on the Colorado Plateau. I'm not saying that they are caused by uranium, but one would have to be a fool not to see that there is a possibility that they are related."[60] Particular attention has been focused on the twenty-thousand-person community of Shiprock, New Mexico, where an abandoned 1.7-million-ton tailings pile covers seventy-two acres in the heart of town. According to Dr. Leon Gottleib, a pulmonary specialist long associated with the Indian Health Service, during the rainy season, water leaching through the tailings pile carries radioactive particles into the nearby San Juan River. "Children swim in the contaminated river; cattle drink from the river; and contaminated fish inhabit these waters," he told us in a letter. In windstorms, radioactive particles are blown into school and residential areas, as well as onto grazing and garden land. In January 1981 Dr. Evelyn Odin, a Shiprock pediatrician, told The Albuquerque Tribune that she had been disturbed by the number of babies being born prematurely with small heads. One child, she said, was born with its esophagus and trachea joined together; another was born without an abdominal wall and with its intestines hanging out. Dr. John Ogle, also of Shiprock, hesitated to blame the defects on radiation. But he told the Tribune that "my gut feeling is that the incidence here is too high." Ogle said in six months he had seen three infants born with heart diseases two with cleft lips and palates, two with skull defects, two with Down's syndrome one with a section of backbone missing, and several with thyroid conditions.[61] A study by Sarah Harvey, director of the Community Health Representative Program, found a doubling of spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, and congenital abnormalities among children of uranium-mining families as opposed to nonminers. Her survey has formed the basis for an investigation of the area partially funded by the March of Dimes.[62] Problems in the Shiprock area may be compounded by the fact that numerous local residents have built their homes with radioactive rock from the mines, or with tailings from the mills. The use of tailings as a building material was widespread throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Despite repeated warnings from independent experts, the AEC did not investigate the possibility that such use of tailings could harm people.[63] The carelessness has had a direct cost. In Grand Junction, Colorado, more than six thousand structures--including several schools--are now known to have tailings deposits in the building materials or in the landfill under them. Streets and sidewalks were also laid with them. In all at least 270,000 tons of tailings were used, resulting in dangerous radiation levels in many Grand Junction houses. A state- and federal-funded program that has thus far cost taxpayers at least $6.5 million has brought "remedial action" to only seven hundred sites. Costs have been estimated at fifteen thousand dollars per home and seventy-five thousand dollars per commercial building.[64] For some the cleanup may have come late. A 1978 study by the state of Colorado indicated cancer rates in Mesa County, where Grand Junction is the prime population center, showed an acute leukemia rate twice the state average. More women were suffering from the disease than men, an indication of radiation poisoning.[65] At Edgemont, South Dakota, an EPA study found sixty-four "hot spots" related to a nearby tailings pile.[66] In 1978 the Neil Brafford family was forced to abandon their home there when they learned it had been built on tailings. The basement in which their young son Chris lived showed radiation levels thirty-nine times normal background. Brafford had bought the house from a mill worker and only later discovered tailings had been used as backfill. "We don't know how much he used," Brafford explained, "but we do know that we're never going to live here again."[67] When they moved out, Brafford's young daughter stopped suffering from a long bout of diarrhea, which had begun when the family moved in. Laboratory tests showed that young Chris Brafford had broken chromosomes. He was also suffering from aching bones, a symptom of potential leukemia. In May of 1981 the Braffords filed a forty-million-dollar lawsuit against the Susquehanna Corporation, owners of the nearby tailings pile.[68]

30. Church Rock Hearings, p. 1.
31. Ibid., p. 9. 32. William Sweet, "Unresolved: The Front End of Nuclear Waste Disposal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1979, p. 45 33. Jack Miller, "Environmental and Health Effects," Uranium Information Network, unpublished. For this finding Miller cites the Colorado Department of Health, Uranium Wastes and Colorado's Environment, second edition (Denver: Colorado Department of Health, August 1971 ), p. 10. 34. David Berick, interview, March 1981. 35. D. G. Jacobs and H. W. Dickson, A Description of Radiological Problems at Inactive Uranium Mill Sites and Formerly Utilized MED/AEC Sites (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February 1979), p. 5. 36. High Country News, February 22, 1980, p. 1. 37. Ibid., December 14, 1979, p. 10. 38. Robert F. Kaufman, et al., "Effects of Uranium Mining and Milling on Ground Water in the Grants Mineral Belt, New Mexico," Ground Water 14, No. 5 (September-October 1976). See also, EPA Radioactivity in Drinking Water, EPA #570/9-81-002 (Washington, D.C.: EPA, January 1981). 39. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Radioactive Water Pollution in the Colorado River Basin, 89th Congress, May 6, 1966, pp. 101-104. 40. Swanson interview. 41. Metzger, Atomic Establishment, p. 164. For this information Metzger cites: DHEW, U.S. PHS, Waste Guide for the Uranium Milling Industry, Technical Report W62-12 (Cincinnati: PHS, 1962); PHS, Region VIII, Radiological Content of Colorado River Basin Bottom Sedimentation, Report PR-10 (Denver: PHS, June 1963); and Radioactivity in Water and Sediments of the Colorado River Basin, 1950-1963, Radiological Health Data and Reports (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1964). 42. GAO, The Uranium Mill Tailings Cleanup: Federal Leadership At Last?, EMD-78-90, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 1978) (hereafter cited as Tailings Leadership); and, NRC, Final General Environmental Impact Statement on Uranium Milling, Vol 1, NUREG-0706 (Washington, D.C.: NRC Office of Material Safety and Safeguards, September 1980), pp. 3-15 (hereafter cited as GEIS-Milling). See also, GAO, The U.S. Mining and Mineral-Processing Industry: An Analysis of Trends and Implications, ID-80-04 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, October 1979). 43. David R. Dreesen, Uranium Mill Tailings: Environmental Implications, LASL 77-37 (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, February 1978). 44. Gilinsky, "Problem," p. 2. 45. NRC, Radon Releases from Uranium Mining and Milling and Their Calculated Health Effects, NUREG-0757 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Material Safety and Safeguards, February 1981), p. 7-3 (hereafter cited as Radon 0757). 46. Reginald Gotchy, interview, April 1981. 47. Chauncy Kepford, Comments on NUREG-00332 (State College, Pa.: Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power, 1977), p. 8; and Chauncy Kepford, interview, June 1981. 48. William Lochstet, "Radiological Impact of the Proposed Crownpoint Uranium Mining Project," August 1978, unpublished manuscript. 49. Robert O. Pohl, "In the Matter of Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Associated Electric Coop., Inc. and Western Farmers Coop., Inc. (Black Fox Station Units 1 and 2," testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, Docket Nos. STN 50-556 and STN 50-557. 50. Walter Jordan, "Errors in 10 CFR Section 51.20, Table S-3," memorandum to James R. Yore, NRC, September 21, 1977; and Walter Jordan, letter to Congressman Clifford Allen, December 9, 1977. 51. NRC, Radon 0757, p. 4-7. 52. High Country News, May 16, 1980, p. 6. 53. Gilinsky, "Problem," p. 5. 54. High Country News, May 16, 1980, p. 6. 55. N. Kochupillai, et al., "Down's Syndrome and Related Abnormalities in an Area of High Background Radiation in Coastal Kerala," Nature 262 (July 1, 1976): 60-61. 56. High Country News, May 16, 1980, p. 6. 57. Peter McPhedran and John R. Crowell, "Leukemia in Monticello, Utah," EPI-67-48-2, Memorandum to the Director, National Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, July 5, 1967. See also, John R. Crowell and Clark W. Heath, Jr., "Leukemia in Parowan and Paragonah, Utah," EPI-67-70-2, memorandum to the Director, National Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, April 26, 1967. In a June 1981 interview, Peter McPhedran told us a more detailed study of Monticello "looked like a good idea, but nobody asked us to pursue it any further." As a result, he said, the study was dropped. Area drinking water had not been studied. 58. Bill Curry, "Small Utah Town, 4 Leukemia Deaths," Washington Post, July 16, 1978. In a March 1981 interview Alan Maughan's mother told us she was certain the tailings piles had caused her son's death. Dr. Carroll Goon, whom we also interviewed, said the large number of leukemia cases surfacing at the same time did seem extraordinary, but that there was no conclusive proof they had been caused by the tailings. There has been, he said, "nothing like it since" in Monticello. 59. "Bad Water Tough on Families," Rocky Mountain News, June 26, 1978, p. 8; and Clarence Ransome and Wanda Bosco, interviews, June 1981. 60. Christopher McLeod, "Uranium Link: New Studies Reveal High Birth Defect Rate in Southwest," Pacific News Service, April 1, 1981. 61. Burt Hubbard, "Navajos Build Radioactive Homes; Offspring May be Bearing Burden," Albuquerque Tribune, January 27, 1981, p. A-2. The problems in Shiprock were also confirmed by Dr. Leon Gottleib, who worked in the area for many years, in an April 1981 interview and in an August 23, 1981 letter. 62. Lynda Taylor, Southwest Research Institute, interview, June 1981. 63. Metzger, Atomic Establishment, p. 164. 64. GAO, Tailings Leadership, p. 8; and GEIS-Milling, p. 2-2. See also, Joanne Omang, "EPA Proposes Rules for Cleaning Up Old Uranium Mills' Radioactive Waste," Washington Post, April 17, 1980. 65. "Mesa County Leukemia, Cancer Incidences High," Rocky Mountain News, United Press International, March 2, 1978. 66. High Country News, April 4, 1980, p. 13. 67. Neil Brafford, interview, July 1980.

68. Andrew Reid, interview, March 1981. Reid is lead attorney in the Braffords' lawsuit.

Ironically one of the worst tailings problems occurred in a community east of the Mississippi--Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, twenty miles southwest of Pittsburgh. As early as 1911 the Standard Chemical Company was importing carload after carload of radioactive ore from a mine at Montrose, Colorado, to extract uranium. At the time, it took about five hundred tons of ore to produce a single gram of radium--a gram that sold for up to $150,000. There were few questions asked. In 1914 company president Joseph M. Flannery told a local newspaper that radium would cure "such things as insanity, tuberculosis, rheumatism and anemia, and a lot of cancers." Flannery and at least two other principals in the company eventually died of radiation sickness.[69] Standard Chemical and the companies that followed it quit the radium business in Canonsburg in 1942. But by then the push was on to build the atomic bomb. The government contracted in secret with the Vitro Corporation to extract leftover uranium from the discarded ore. When Vitro finished operations in the late fifties, it was ready to go into the waste-storage business. At least 160,000 tons of radioactive residues were strewn around Canonsburg, some of them lining the bottom of a three-acre lagoon where local children regularly waded in the summer and skated in the winter. In the early sixties the AEC allowed the lagoon to be filled in with tailings. It was an extraordinary decision, since--contrary to regulations--the government did not own the site. Health physicist Robert Gallagher, who performed a preliminary survey there, called the move "incredible." He charged that the AEC approval was either "a special favor or an oversight of gigantic magnitude."[70] As for the fill job, Joseph Swiger, project manager for the dumping, termed it "the worst and sloppiest job I've ever worked on." It was "morally objectionable," he told The Pittsburgh Press, "because the material was hazardous."[71] In 1967 the site was sold for $130,000 to a local entrepreneur named Vaughn Crile, who was never warned that there might be a radiation problem. Crile built an industrial park on top of the tailings and brought in fourteen tenants along with his family business. The DOE surveyed the site in 1978 and found that the 125 workers there were being exposed to radon concentrations fourteen times above the level officially considered safe.[72] The news was not well received by Crile's tenants. At least eight had left by early 1981. Workers were hesitant to take jobs there, and at least one claimed the place had ruined his health. He was George Mahranus, a mechanic at the park for eight years, who finally quit in fear. "Towards the end," he told us, "I could hardly lift anything, couldn't pull on the wrenches. I got a soreness in my joints. Most of my hair fell out. My front teeth came loose on me. I never felt like this before in my life." Mahranus, who was in his forties, spent most of his working days on the plant floor, fixing tires and engines. "The radiation never occurred to me till they started drilling at the site to test for it," he said. "Then I decided to get the hell out of there." With just ten teeth left in his mouth and an unexplained lump behind his ear, Mahranus was apprehensive of doctors confirming his worst fears. "I do feel better since I left there," he told us. "But now I can't sit long and my fingertips go numb on me. I always did hard work. But now there's no way for me to go out and put in eight hours. It would kill me."[73] Park owner Vaughn Crile was skeptical of Mahranus's claims, but was also deeply bitter toward the government, which he said had cost him thousands of dollars. "They should relocate us, but they're so ungodly slow," he complained.[74] At least eighteen other radioactive "hot spots" were identified around town including a ballfield and an American Legion park. A spot near the lagoon registered five hundred times normal background levels. Some locals complained that their gardens would not grow; others were warned not to eat the vegetables that did come up. A rain barrel at one Canonsburg home showed radiation levels eight thousand times background, while materials used to build one house registered 240 times the normal radium count. At least 150 homes were marked for decontamination.[75] But, as at Grand Junction, the cleanup orders may have been too late. Epidemiologist Evelyn Talbott of the University of Pittsburgh studied the area. She told us preliminary figures indicated a lung-cancer rate twice normal among men over forty-five, and three times normal among men over seventy.[76] Informal studies indicate things may be even worse. Agnes Engel, a mother of two in her late thirties and a lifelong resident, surveyed 150 of her neighbors. She found an astonishing fifty-three of them complaining of thyroid problems. Like scores of other local children, Engel had been drawn to the contaminated lagoon when she was young. Before it was filled in, she told us, "there were cattails and frogs there. It was an irresistible attraction." But there had been no warning of the radioactive chemicals at the lagoon's bottom. Engel has since suffered from multiple health disorders including strange bleeding problems, a thyroid condition at age seventeen, a minimally brain-damaged son, a hysterectomy at thirty-five. "My two sisters have also had similar problems," she told us. "And there are so many other women here who've had them . . . so many strange things. . . . "[77]

69. Ben A. Franklin, "U.S. Testing Workers for Effects of 13 Years Amid Atomic Wastes" New York Times, May 5, 1979, p. A-1.
70. Pittsburgh Press, January 23, 1980, p. C-1. 71. Ibid., January 21, 1980, p. A-8. 72. Franklin, "U.S. Testing Workers." 73. George Mahranus, interview, April 1981. See also, Albert Neri, "Radioactive Park Site Has Mechanic `Scared,'" Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 19, 1979. 74. Vaughn Crile, interview, April 1981. 75. Pittsburgh Press, March 2, 1979, and June 22, 1980, p. A-10. 76. Evelyn Talbott, interview, October 1980. See also, Pittsburgh Press, July 30, 1980, p. B-3.

77. Agnes Engel, interview, October 1980. See also, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 19, 1979; and Agnes Engel, Residential Research Survey of Thyroid Disorders (Strabane, Pa.: U.C.A.R.E., March 21, 1979


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The sievert (symbol: Sv) is the International System of Units (SI) derived unit of equivalent radiation dose, effective dose, and committed dose. Quantities that are measured in sieverts are designed to represent the stochastic biological effects of ionizing radiation. The sievert should not be used to express the unmodified absorbed dose of radiation energy, which is a clear physical quantity measured in grays. To enable consideration of biological effects, further calculations must be performed to convert absorbed dose into effective dose, the details of which depend on the biological context. This can be far more complicated than just multiplying by a weighting factor.
The sievert is of fundamental importance in radiation dosimetry, and is named after Rolf Maximilian Sievert, a Swedish medical physicist renowned for work on radiation dosage measurement and research into the biological effects of radiation. One sievert equals 100 rem, an older unit of measurement still in widespread use. One sievert carries with it a 5.5% chance of eventually developing cancer.[1] Doses greater than 1 sievert received over a short time period are likely to cause radiation poisoning, possibly leading to death within weeks.

The gray and sievert units are both special names for the SI derived units of joules per kilogram (m2/s2 if expressed in base units), though they are not interchangeable.[2]
1 Sv = 1 J/kg = 1 Gy
The gray is used with quantities of absorbed dose in any material, while the sievert is used with equivalent, effective, and committed dose in biological tissue. The latter quantities are weighted averages of absorbed dose designed to be more representative of the stochastic health effects of radiation, and use of the sievert implies that appropriate regulatory weighting factors have been applied to the original measurement.[1]
For example, an absorbed dose of 1 mGy of alpha radiation gives an equivalent dose of 20 mSv because alpha has a radiation weighting factor of 20. This can appear to lead to a paradox whereby the energy of the incident radiation field is increased by a factor of 20 when sieverts are used, thereby violating the laws of Conservation of energy. However this is not the case, as it is the biological effect that is being expressed when using sieverts rather than the actual physical energy imparted by the incident radiation.
Confusion can be caused as there are two different radiation quantities that can both be measured in the same units of J/kg; the sievert and the gray. The sievert and the gray are different names for the same unit of delivery, but they are used in different contexts.[2]

[edit] SI units

This SI unit is named after Rolf Maximilian Sievert. As with every International System of Units (SI) unit whose name is derived from the proper name of a person, the first letter of its symbol is upper case (Sv). However, when an SI unit is spelled out in English, it should always begin with a lower case letter (sievert), except in a situation where any word in that position would be capitalized, such as at the beginning of a sentence or in capitalized material such as a title. Note that "degree Celsius" conforms to this rule because the "d" is lowercase. —Based on The International System of Units, section 5.2.
Frequently used SI multiples are the millisievert (1 mSv = 0.001 Sv) and microsievert (1 μSv = 0.000001 Sv). The conventional units for its time derivative is mSv/h. Regulatory limits and chronic doses are often given in units of mSv/a or Sv/a, where they are understood to represent an average over the entire year. In many occupational scenarios, the hourly dose rate might fluctuate to levels thousands of times higher for a brief period of time, without infringing on the annual limits. The conversion from hours to years varies because of leap years and exposure schedules, but approximate conversions are:
1 mSv/h = 8.766 Sv/a
114.1 μSv/h = 1 Sv/a
Conversion from hourly rates to annual rates is further complicated by seasonal fluctuations in natural radiation, decay of artificial sources, and intermittent proximity between humans and sources. The ICRP once adopted fixed conversion for occupational exposure, although these have not appeared in recent documents:[3]
8 h = 1 day
40 h = 1 week
50 weeks = 1 year
Therefore, for occupation exposures of that time period,
1 mSv/h = 2 Sv/a
500 µSv/h = 1 Sv/a
An older unit for the equivalent dose is the rem,[4] still often used in the United States. One sievert is equal to 100 rem:
100.0000 rem=100000.0 mrem=1 Sv=1.000000 Sv=1000.000 mSv=1000000 µSv
1.0000 rem=1000.0 mrem=1 rem=0.010000 Sv=10.000 mSv=10000 µSv
0.1000 rem=100.0 mrem=1 mSv=0.001000 Sv=1.000 mSv=1000 µSv
0.0010 rem=1.0 mrem=1 mrem=0.000010 Sv=0.010 mSv=10 µSv
0.0001 rem=0.1 mrem=1 µSv=0.000001 Sv=0.001 mSv=1 µSv

[edit] Health effects

Ionizing radiation has deterministic and stochastic effects on human health. The deterministic effects that can lead to acute radiation syndrome only occur in the case of high doses (> ~0.1 Gy) and high dose rates (> ~0.1 Gy/h). A model of deterministic risk would require different weighting factors (not yet established) than are used in the calculation of equivalent and effective dose. To avoid confusion, deterministic effects are normally compared to absorbed dose in units of Gy, not Sv.
Stochastic effects are those that occur randomly, such as radiation-induced cancer. The consensus of the nuclear industry, nuclear regulators, and governments, is that the incidence of cancers due to ionizing radiation can be modeled as increasing linearly with effective dose at a rate of 5.5% per sievert.[1] Individual studies, alternate models, and earlier versions of the industry consensus have produced other risk estimates scattered around this consensus model. There is general agreement that the risk is much higher for infants and fetuses than adults, higher for the middle-aged than for seniors, and higher for women than for men, though there is no quantitative consensus about this.[5][6] There is much less data, and much more controversy, regarding the possibility of cardiac and teratogenic effects, and the modelling of internal dose.[7]
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends limiting artificial irradiation of the public to an average of 1 mSv (0.001 Sv) of effective dose per year, not including medical and occupational exposures.[1] For comparison, radiation levels inside the US capitol building are 0.85 mSv/a, close to the regulatory limit, because of the uranium content of the granite structure.[8] According to the ICRP model, someone who spent 20 years inside the capitol building would have an extra one in a thousand chance of getting cancer, over and above any other existing risk. (20 a·0.85 mSv/a·0.001 Sv/mSv·5.5%/Sv = ~0.1%) That "existing risk" is much higher; an average American would have a one in ten chance of getting cancer during this same 20 year period, even without any exposure to artificial radiation.
In 2012 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation stated that for typical background radiation levels (1-13 mSv per year) it's not possible to account for any health effects and for exposures under 100 mSv, it's only possible in specific conditions.[9]

[edit] Dose examples

Since radiation doses are not frequently encountered in everyday life, the following examples can help illustrate relative magnitudes. These are meant to be examples only, not a comprehensive list of possible radiation doses. An "acute dose" is one that occurs over a short and finite period of time, while a "chronic dose" is a dose that continues for an extended period of time so that it is better described by a dose rate.

[edit] Dose examples

98nSv-banana equivalent dose, a whimsical unit of radiation dose[10][note 1]
0.25μSv-U.S. limit on effective dose from a single airport security screening[11]
5 to 10μSv-one set of dental radiographs[12]
80μSv-average dose to people living within 16 km of Three Mile Island accident[13]
0.4 to 0.6mSv-two-view mammogram, using weighting factors updated in 2007[14]
2 to 7mSv-barium fluoroscopy, e.g. Barium meal, up to 2 minutes, 4-24 spot images[15]
10 to 30mSv-single full-body CT scan[16][17]
68mSv-estimated maximum dose to evacuees who lived closest to the Fukushima I nuclear accidents[18]
0.67Sv-highest dose received by a worker responding to the Fukushima emergency[19][note 1]
4.5 to 6Sv-fatal acute doses during Goiânia accident
21Sv-fatal acute dose to Louis Slotin in 1946 criticality accident[20]
64Sv-nonfatal dose to Albert Stevens spread over ~21 years, due to 1945 human experiment[21][note 1]

[edit] Dose rate examples

All conversions between hours and years have assumed continuous presence in a steady field, disregarding known fluctuations, intermittent exposure and radioactive decay. Converted values are shown in parentheses.
<1mSv/a<0.1μSv/hSteady dose rates below 0.1 µSv/h are difficult to measure and should viewed skeptically
1mSv/a(0.1μSv/h avg)ICRP recommended maximum for artificial irradiation of the public,
excluding medical and occupational exposures.
2.4mSv/a(0.27μSv/h avg)Human exposure to natural background radiation, global average[note 1]
24mSv/a(2.7μSv/h avg)Natural background radiation at airline cruise altitude[22] [note 2]
0.13Sv/a(15μSv/h avg)Ambient field inside most radioactive house in Ramsar, Iran[23][note 3]
(0.8Sv/a)0.09mSv/hNatural radiation on a monazite beach near Guarapari, Brazil.[24]
(9Sv/a)1mSv/hNRC definition of a high radiation area in a nuclear power plant, warranting a chain-link fence[25]
(0.24kSv/a)27mSv/hclose proximity to a 100 W radioisotope thermal generator[26]
(1.7kSv/a)0.19Sv/hHighest reading from fallout of the Trinity bomb, 32 km away, 3 hours after detonation.[27][note 3]
(>90kSv/a)>10Sv/hmost radioactive hotspot found in Fukushima I in areas normally accessible to workers[28][note 3]
(2.3MSv/a)270Sv/htypical PWR spent fuel bundle, after 10 year cooldown, no shielding[29]
(90MGy/a)10kGy/himmediate predicted activation of reactor wall in possible future fusion reactors.[30] After 100 years of decay, typical levels would be 2-20 mSv/h.[31] After approximately 300 years of decay the fusion waste would produce the same dose rate as exposure to coal ash, with the volume of fusion waste naturally being orders of magnitude less than from coal ash.[32]
Notes on examples:
  1. ^ a b c d Noted figures are dominated by a committed dose which gradually turned into effective dose over an extended period of time. Therefore the true acute dose must be lower, but standard dosimetry practice is to account committed doses as acute in the year the radioisotopes are taken into the body.
  2. ^ The dose rate received by air crews is highly dependent on the radiation weighting factors chosen for protons and neutrons, which have changed over time and remain controversial.
  3. ^ a b c Noted figures exclude any committed dose from radioisotopes taken into the body. Therefore the total radiation dose would be higher unless respiratory protection was used.

[edit] History

The sievert has its origin in the roentgen equivalent man (rem) which was derived from CGS units. The International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) promoted a switch to coherent SI units in the 1970s,[33] and announced in 1976 that it planned to formulate a suitable unit for equivalent dose.[34] The ICRP pre-empted the ICRU by introducing the sievert in 1977.[35]
The sievert was adopted by the International Committee for Weights and Measures (CIPM) in 1980, five years after adopting the gray. The CIPM then issued an explanation in 1984, recommending when the sievert should be used as opposed to the gray. That explanation was updated in 2002 to bring it closer to the ICRP's definition of equivalent dose, which had changed in 1990. Specifically, the ICRP had renamed the dose equivalent to equivalent dose, renamed the quality factor (Q) to radiation weighting factor (WR), and dropped another weighting factor 'N' in 1990. In 2002, the CIPM similarly dropped the weighting factor 'N' from their explanation but otherwise kept the old terminology and symbols. This explanation only appears in the appendix to the SI brochure and is not part of the definition of the sievert.[2]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d "The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection". Annals of the ICRP. ICRP publication 103 37 (2-4). 2007. ISBN 978-0-7020-3048-2. Retrieved 17 May 2012.
  2. ^ a b c International Bureau of Weights and Measures (2006), The International System of Units (SI) (8th ed.), ISBN 92-822-2213-6,
  3. ^ Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection and of the International Commission on Radiological Units. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 47. US Department of Commerce. 1950. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
  4. ^ Office of Air and Radiation; Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (May 2007). "Radiation: Risks and Realities" (PDF). Radiation: Risks and Realities. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. p. 2. Retrieved 19 March 2011.
  5. ^ Peck, Donald J. "How to Understand and Communicate Radiation Risk". Image Wisely. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  6. ^ Effects of ionizing radiation : UNSCEAR 2006 report to the General Assembly, with scientific annexes. New York: United Nations. 2008. ISBN 978-92-1-142263-4. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  7. ^ European Committee on Radiation Risk (2010). In Busby, Chris et al. 2010 recommendations of the ECRR : the health effects of exposure to low doses of ionizing radiation (Regulators' ed. ed.). Aberystwyth: Green Audit. ISBN 978-1-897761-16-8. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  8. ^ Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program. "Radiation in the Environment". US Army Corps of Engineers. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  9. ^ "UN approves radiation advice". World Nuclear News. 2012.
  10. ^ RadSafe mailing list: original posting and follow up thread. FGR11 discussed.
  11. ^ American National Standards Institute (2009). Radiation Safety for Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X‐Rays or Gamma Radiation. ANSI/HPS N43.17. Retrieved 31 May 2012.
  12. ^ Hart, D.; and Wall, B.F. (2002). Radiation Exposure of the UK Population from Medical and Dental X-ray Examinations. National Radiological Protection Board. p. 9. ISBN 0 85951 468 4. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  13. ^ "What Happened and What Didn't in the TMI-2 Accident". American Nuclear Society. Retrieved 2011-03-16.
  14. ^ Hendrick, R. Edward (October 2010). "Radiation Doses and Cancer Risks from Breast Imaging Studies". Radiology 257: 246–253. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  15. ^ Wall, B.F.; and Hart, D. (1997). "Revised Radiation Doses for Typical X-Ray Examinations". The British Journal of Radiology 70: 437–439. Retrieved 18 May 2012. (5,000 patient dose measurements from 375 hospitals)
  16. ^ Brenner, David J.; Hall, Eric J. (2007). "Computed Tomography — an Increasing Source of Radiation Exposure". New England Journal of Medicine 357 (22): 2277–2284. doi:10.1056/NEJMra072149. PMID 18046031.
  17. ^ Van Unnik, JG; Broerse, JJ; Geleijns, J; Jansen, JT; Zoetelief, J; Zweers, D (1997). "Survey of CT techniques and absorbed dose in various Dutch hospitals". The British journal of radiology 70 (832): 367–71. PMID 9166072. (3000 examinations from 18 hospitals)
  18. ^ Hosoda, Masahiro (2011). "The time variation of dose rate artificially increased by the Fukushima nuclear crisis". Scientific Reports 1. doi:10.1038/srep00087. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  19. ^ American Nuclear Society (March 2012). "Appendix B". In Klein, Dale; and Corradini, Michael. Fukushima Daiichi: ANS Committee Report. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  20. ^ McLaughlin, Thomas P.; et al (May 2000). Los Alamos National Laboratory. p. 75 LA-13638. Retrieved 21 May 2012.
  21. ^ Moss, William; Eckhardt, Roger (1995). "The Human Plutonium Injection Experiments". Los Alamos Science. Radiation Protection and the Human Radiation Experiments (23): 177–223. Retrieved 13 November 2012.
  22. ^ Bailey, Susan (January 2000). "Air crew radiation exposure—An overview". Nuclear News. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  23. ^ Hendry, Jolyon H; Simon, Steven L; Wojcik, Andrzej; Sohrabi, Mehdi; Burkart, Werner; Cardis, Elisabeth; Laurier, Dominique; Tirmarche, Margot; Hayata, Isamu (1 June 2009). "Human exposure to high natural background radiation: what can it teach us about radiation risks?". Journal of Radiological Protection 29 (2A): A29–A42. doi:10.1088/0952-4746/29/2A/S03. PMID 19454802. Retrieved 1 December 2012.
  24. ^ United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (2000). "Annex B". Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. vol. 1. United Nations. p. 121. Retrieved 11 November 2012.
  26. ^ Summerer, Leopold; et al (2009). "Technology-Based Design and Scaling Laws for RTG's for Space Exploration in the 100 W Range". 60th International Astronautical Congress. Daejeon, South Korea. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  27. ^ Widner, Thomas; et al. (June 2009). Draft Final Report of the Los Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and Assessment (LAHDRA) Project. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved 12 November 2012.
  28. ^ "Fukushima radiation hotspot". World Nuclear News. 2011-08-02. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  29. ^ Su, S. (August 2006). TAD Source Term and Dose Rate Evaluation. Bechtel Saic. 000-30R-GGDE-00100-000-00A. Retrieved 20 May 2012.
  30. ^ Di Pace, Luigi (2012). "Ch. 14: Radioactive Waste Management of Fusion Power Plants". In Rehab Abdel Rahman. Radioactive Waste. InTech. p. 318. ISBN 978-953-51-0551-0. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
  31. ^ "Consideration of strategies, industry experience, processes and time scales for the recycling of fusion irradiated material". UKAEA. p. vi. "dose rates of 2-20 mSv/h, typical of plasma facing components after intermediate storage for up to 100 years"
  32. ^ Figure X page 13.
  33. ^ Wyckoff, H. O. (April 1977). "Round table on SI units: ICRU Activities". International Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association. Paris, France. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  34. ^ Wyckoff, H. O. (May 1976). "The New Special Names of SI Units in the Field of Ionizing Radiations". British Journal of Radiology 49: 476–477. ISSN 1748-880X. Retrieved 18 May 2012.
  35. ^ "Recommendations of the ICRP". Annals of the ICRP. ICRP publication 26 1 (3). 1977. Retrieved 17 May 2012.