October 19, 2012
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following press release:
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Order to Honeywell International, Inc., outlining actions the company must take before it can resume its uranium conversion operations at the Honeywell Metropolis Works facility.
Honeywell Metropolis Works takes milled uranium and converts it into uranium hexafluoride gas which is then enriched at other facilities to make fuel for commercial power reactors. The Metropolis, Ill., facility has been shut down since May 9.
The plant will not be allowed to resume operations until the provisions outlined in the Confirmatory Order are satisfied.
"These measures ensure the continued safety of the people who work at Honeywell as well as those who live nearby," said Victor McCree, the NRC's Region II Administrator. "Their safety has been and will continue to be our primary objective."
During an inspection in May that examined how the facility would fare in a major earthquake or a tornado, the NRC concluded that such an event could result in a higher risk to the public than originally assumed. The inspection identified that process equipment in the facility lacks seismic restraints, support and bracing that would assure integrity during a significant seismic or wind event. Specifically, the amount of uranium hexafluoride that could be released into the environment should the process equipment be damaged by such an event could be significantly larger than assumed in the facility's Emergency Response Plan. The material that could be released poses more of a chemical hazard than a radiation hazard.
There is no current safety concern at the facility since it is shut down. In a shutdown configuration, a seismic event or a tornado would not result in a significant release of material.
The NRC identified two apparent violations associated with the inspection findings. Honeywell's Emergency Response Plan, submitted in May 2005, failed to identify accident sequences related to credible seismic and tornado events. In addition, the plant's Integrated Safety Analysis Summary erroneously states that "the plant is designed to withstand [significant] earthquake[s] with no safety implications."
*Rest of the document can be viewed at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/
Lessons from nuclear disasters
Issues in Science and Technology
Issues in Science and Technology
June 22, 2012
I write this comment two weeks after my first trip to Chernobyl, where I had the opportunity to visit the nuclear power plant facility and to speak with villagers whose lives were permanently touched by the disaster 26 years ago. From the perspective of the plant's management, catastrophe has become a success, given that construction is under way for a new confinement shelter for Reactor No. 4, and a new onsite storage facility for the 20,000 used fuel rods is planned. Management considers itself expert in managing the risks of nuclear reactor accidents, and it has hosted delegations from Fukushima. My "lesson learned" is that the enormity of the consequences of a reactor accident is unacceptable, even if the immediate number of deaths is small and the future burden of excess cancer is estimated to be so small that it will not be detected.
The Fukushima disaster is another opportunity to learn, adding to Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, and also to earlier incidents involving the Windscale reactor in the United Kingdom and the Kyshtym accident in the Urals. In "Learning from Fukushima" (Issues, Spring 2012), Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer and colleagues find three general lessons in their analysis of the Fukushima disaster. the interplay of politics and technology, the reach of the disaster beyond Japan, and the limitations of models. They are correct in noting the critical relevance of context; postmortems on each disaster have pointed to diverse contributing factors beyond engineering and operations. There is, however, a unifying overconfidence in engineering and risk predictions.
JONATHAN M. SAMET ,Professor and Flora L. Thornton Chair Department of Preventive Medicine .Keck School of Medicine ,Director, Institute for Global Health,University of Southern California ,Los Angeles, California,jsamet@med.usc.edu
Nuclear power in Japan
The past history of nuclear power in Japan is definitely past history, as all reactors have now been shut down and will have difficulty getting approval to restart. After Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Japanese public understandably came to fear radiation (in contrast with Germany). I cannot comment on the history of Japanese nuclear power, but I do have several comments on other parts of the article by Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer and colleagues.
The primary cause of the enormous damage and loss of life at the Fukushima event was the tsunami, which the article glides over. It states that "One common refrain has been that Fukushima happened because politics interfered with technology." but a review of several reports does not include this "common refrain."
The article states that "Inadequate risk assessment models have been identified as another main culprit." I agree with the authors that "models provide useful but incomplete guidance." particularly if the guidance is not followed. The tsunami did produce an enormous wave, but the models had predicted that. One close-by utility had followed the advice and its plants were safe (see Safe Shutdown of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, The Closest BWRs to the 3/11/11 Epicenter, Isao Kato, presentation at MIT, March 2012).
Finally, the suggestion to make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an international licensing agency suggests the authors' lack of knowledge about the agency, its performance, and its status.
I agree that transparency in decision making and involving the public are wise approaches, if cultural differences are recognized. Both approaches have been recommended for use in the United States by several committees of the National Academies [see Improving Risk Communication (National Academies Press, 1989) and Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (National Academies Press, 1996) (one of the authors of this article was a member of the committee that produced this report)].
I believe that the major lessons from the Fukushima disaster are those noted by the IAEA and American Nuclear Society reviews: the necessity to develop coordinated government/industry response procedures and the willingness to address the severe accident analyses, by either spending the necessary funds or closing the plants.
December 3, 2007
SASKATOON, SASKATCHEWAN--(Marketwire - Dec. 3, 2007) - Cameco Corporation (TSX:CCO) (NYSE:CCJ) reported today that the company is making good progress in dealing with the increased water inflow and is putting in place plans to permanently seal off the affected area in the underground mine at the Rabbit Lake operation. After further assessment, the company is allowing additional time before resuming underground mining activities.
Cameco has been able to more accurately measure the additional water entering the mine and now estimates it is about 110 cubic metres per hour. The mine is currently able to remove water at approximately the same rate as all the water entering the underground areas after successfully completing a planned 25% increase to the surface water handling capacity sooner than anticipated. The site had been in the process of increasing that capacity prior to experiencing the incident last week and is working toward a further, incremental increase. The mine is currently using only 4% of designated water storage areas available underground. The Rabbit Lake operation is handling this situation according to the site's water inflow contingency plans.
As is customary in such events, site crews are in the process of building concrete barriers, or bulkheads, intended to permanently contain the increased water flow. The company has set a preliminary target of the first quarter of 2008 to seal off the increased water flow. Mining will resume when the water flow has been sufficiently reduced to provide an adequate margin of surface water handling capacity.
The Rabbit Lake operation has about 270 Cameco employees. The company does not anticipate layoffs, however, some Cameco employees may be reassigned to other tasks. There are also 220 contractor employees whose schedules may be adjusted to meet priorities on site.
The increased water flow originated from an area being mined about 90 metres below surface. The rock around the area continues to be stable and Cameco's geotechnical engineers have found no evidence of weakness. Similar events in past years have been handled by the mine successfully. The entire Eagle Point mine is located in stable, basement rock and is accessed by a ramp from surface. The company uses an open stope mining method in which the ore is drilled and blasted from a tunnel above and falls to a lower level. It is then picked up by scoop trams and transported by truck to surface.
Cigar Lake Licence Update
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has issued Cameco an amended construction licence for Cigar Lake. The licence will be valid for two years until December 31, 2009.
Cameco plans to provide an update on progress at Cigar Lake on December 19, 2007.
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
The above noted 2008 preliminary target date for Rabbit Lake to recommence mining is forward-looking information and is based upon the following key assumptions, and is subject to the following factors that could cause results to differ materially:
- we have assumed that the minewater inflow rates will not change except for planned reductions and the company will maintain sufficient pumping and treatment capacity to match or exceed the minewater inflow rates, but that is subject to a number of risks including equipment failure;
- we have assumed that our plan to seal the water inflow by constructing a concrete bulkhead and filling the area behind the bulkhead with concrete and grout will succeed and be completed in a timely manner, but that is subject to a number of risks including that the plan does not work as anticipated or takes longer than expected to complete due to delays in construction;
- we have assumed that there is no disruption in our plans to seal the water inflow and recommence mining due to among other things: natural phenomena, such as fires, cave-ins or floods; labour disputes; litigation or arbitration proceedings; delay in obtaining or failure to procure the required equipment (such as trucks to haul concrete), operating parts and supplies, including concrete and grout necessary to seal off the water inflow; equipment failure, including equipment provided by the concrete supplier and transporter; an inability to obtain the necessary permits and government approvals; unexpected geological or hydrological conditions; and adverse ground conditions. The company is subject to the risk that any or all of the foregoing will occur or other development or operating risks.
If actual results differ from the assumptions set above or if any of the material factors identified above occur, the 2008 mining restart date for Rabbit Lake may differ materially from the above forecast.
PORT HOPE-CANADA'S NUCLEAR WASTELAND: New book exposes town's deadly uranium contamination
Comments : We know that the argument of local mining company in VA will be that this is the “OLD WAY” uranium mining was done, but the following excerpt shows that even in 2008, the effort to do what was right for this town has not been done.
“The Canadian government refuses to conduct comprehensive health studies, even though such studies were first promised in 1979. This political indifference continues despite the horrific results of Health Canada's findings in Port Hope:
* four times the expected number of brain cancers in children between 1971 and 1985;
* 100 excess female deaths from circulatory disease from 1986 to 1997;
* five times the provincial rate of nasal cancers in men from 1971 to 1985;
* twice the provincial rate of female brain cancers from 1986 to 1997;
* a 48% increase in all childhood cancer deaths.
In the absence of official government health studies, the Port Hope Community Health Concerns Committee has been raising money through auctions and book sales to pay for the biological testing of Port Hope residents. (In a country as rich as Canada, I consider this outrageous.)”
PORT HOPE-CANADA'S NUCLEAR WASTELAND: New book exposes town's deadly uranium contamination
June 1, 2008
In the early 1930s, a radium refinery was built in Port Hope, Ontario, and tons of uranium-bearing wastes accumulated around the town.
During World War II, Canada was secretly approached by the United States and Britain to make this depleted uranium available for the atomic bomb project. The private company, Eldorado, was quietly taken over by the Canadian government. The refinery was then used to process uranium to fuel the uranium enrichment plant at Oak Ridge that produced the explosive for the Hiroshima atomic bomb. It also supplied the nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington, that produced the plutonium for the Nagasaki bomb.
After the war, Canadian uranium mining boomed on military contracts, and new mines were opened, first in the Northwest Territories and northern Saskatchewan, then in northern Ontario's Lake Elliott region.
All of the uranium from these mines was refined at Port Hope. By 1959, uranium had become Canada's fourth largest export, after wheat, wood, and pulp, and almost all of it was for the production of nuclear weapons.
In 1975, it was discovered that homes and schools in Port Hope were badly contaminated by radioactive wastes from the government-operated refinery.
A resident of Port Hope, Pat McNamara, has now written a book about this radioactive contamination and its devastating effects on the town's residents. His title for the book is Port Hope: Canada's Nuclear Wasteland.
Following is the text of a press release he issued about the book.
This book is about the residents of Port Hope screaming for protection from the Canadian government. Our elected officials and the nuclear regulatory bodies have sacrificed the health of Port Hope residents to protect the nuclear industry since the start of the atomic age in the 1940s.
Port Hope has had a longer exposure to radioactive contamination and its lethal effects than any other community. Uranium ore and its waste products have been hauled along our streets and processed in our harbour since 1932-13 years before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan.
We have 3.5 million cubic metres (4.6 million cubic yards) of radioactive waste spread under our homes, schools, parks, and in our harbour. Port Hope is saturated with radioactive heavy metals and chemicals. We also face daily emissions of uranium, nitrous oxide, arsenic, and fluorides from two nuclear processing facilities in the middle of our town of 12,500 people. Neither facility has a buffer zone around it to protect us.
The Canadian government refuses to conduct comprehensive health studies, even though such studies were first promised in 1979. This political indifference continues despite the horrific results of Health Canada's findings in Port Hope:
* four times the expected number of brain cancers in children between 1971 and 1985;
* 100 excess female deaths from circulatory disease from 1986 to 1997;
* five times the provincial rate of nasal cancers in men from 1971 to 1985;
* twice the provincial rate of female brain cancers from 1986 to 1997;
* a 48% increase in all childhood cancer deaths.
In the absence of official government health studies, the Port Hope Community Health Concerns Committee has been raising money through auctions and book sales to pay for the biological testing of Port Hope residents. (In a country as rich as Canada, I consider this outrageous.)
I became involved in nuclear issues in 2004 after I saw the results of the 1978 radon tests conducted in the elementary school my daughter attended. Radon levels under the kindergarten classroom and the gymnasium were found to be 125 times higher than the permissible level. The test results, however, were never made public. The Atomic Energy Control Board gave the school a "clean bill of health" and never mentioned it again.
I was not a nuclear activist prior to 2004. I was a carpenter who had volunteered to improve the playground at my daughter's school. I knew nothing about radioactive waste and up to that time had no intention of learning about it. In the last three-and-a-half years, however, I have spent more than 7,000 hours studying and researching every aspect of the nuclear industry and its radioactive waste. I have made over 100 presentations totaling 200,000 words to MPs, MPPs, municipal councils, federal and provincial agencies, scientists, academics, and our local school board on the dangers we face in Port Hope.
My book is easy to read, but hard to stomach. It's difficult to accept that our federal government has knowingly been harming and killing our children and our friends in Port Hope for over 60 years to keep its activities secret. This is the story of the nuclear violation of Port Hope by the Canadian government.
Part of the proceeds from the sale of Port Hope: Canada's Nuclear Wasteland will be donated to the Port Hope Community Health Concerns Committee to help pay for the biological testing of the town's residents.
NRC ISSUES CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER TO URANIUM ONE USA FOLLOWING URANIUM RELEASE EVENT IN CANADA
July 9, 2012
WASHINGTON, July 6 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following press release:
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a Confirmatory Action Letter documenting actions that Uranium One USA has agreed to take following an incident in Canada in which three workers were exposed to yellowcake from a drum shipped from a U. S. facility.
The incident occurred on June 23 at a uranium conversion facility in Blind River, Canada. When a worker loosened a ring clamp on a 55-gallon drum containing uranium oxide yellowcake the lid blew off, ejecting about 26 kilograms of the material into the air. The worker closest to the drum and two others in the area, who were not wearing respirators, were exposed to airborne uranium. Any adverse health effects to the workers would likely be caused by chemical, rather than radiological effects.
The barrel had been shipped from Uranium One's Willow Creek Facility in Wyoming to a Canadian conversion facility on May 29. Following this incident several other drums shipped to the Canadian facility containing yellowcake were found to be bulging from internal pressure.
The Canadian facility has stopped opening containers of yellowcake from Uranium One's Willow Creek facility until they can develop a plan to safely do so. The licensee has notified the NRC that it has suspended all shipping from the Willow Creek facility until it determines how the drums became pressurized.
Under the terms of the Confirmatory Action Letter, Uranium One has agreed to investigate the cause of the event; develop a course of action to ensure the safety of any other unopened drums containing yellowcake previously shipped from its Wyoming facility; and develop a corrective action plan to ensure the safety of continued storage, shipment or further processing of the yellowcake.
After similar events occurred at several facilities in 1998, corrective actions were adopted by the industry to prevent recurrence. Specifically, new procedures were adopted to ensure that drums containing yellowcake remained unsealed for at least three hours to ensure adequate cooling of the material.
